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ABSTRACT 
Information Warfare (IW) is a reality of the 21st century. With the advancements 
in computer technology and innovations in information systems and networks, 
information has become a forceful weapon and an element of national power. 
Consequently, the conduct of war in this age has been greatly affected by the 
manner in which the information is treated by the opposing forces. The United 
States Department of Defense (DoD) has been aggressively formulating doctrine 
and policy on the subject since the early 1990s. The study of this evolution offers 
guidelines to other coalition partners who may wish to make their own 
organizations effective and viable by incorporating changes to suit their scale and 
scope of operations.  
IW, now called information operations in the U.S. DoD, is the 
amalgamation of multiple independent and diverse capabilities. It will be explored 
that some of the latest IW capabilities may make less of a contribution in 
developing countries where organizations are less dependent on advanced 
information systems and communication networks in the cyber domain. This 
thesis will describe U.S. IO implementation methodology and in the end identify 
feasible IW capabilities in the backdrop of developing countries. A simplistic IW 
operational model will also be presented for consideration in counterinsurgency 
and counterterrorism campaigns.  
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In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy’s 
country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. 
So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to 
capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to 
destroy them. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not 
supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the 
enemy’s resistance without fighting. 
Sun Tzu1 
A. FOREWORD 
“Information warfare” (IW) is a very broad term and much has been written 
about it from the military and commercial perspectives. The term is directly linked 
with the word “information” itself. It is a well-established fact that in today’s high-
tech world, a capability to acquire, leverage, and protect information and 
information-processing systems is compulsory for nations that wish to remain 
competitive in the battlefields of commerce and the military. 
IW has become highly relevant in the post–Cold War era, in which the 
nature of conflict has been transformed from bipolar global structures to 
multisided local and regional contests in which the military element is a crucial 
part of, but not the driving force for, competition and conflict. IW as a concept 
covers an expanse ranging from media wars to electronic combat and from 
economic competition to strategic conflict waged against civilian populations. For 
military planners, it is important to understand the basic tenets contained within 
IW in order to organize its structure and train personnel accordingly.  
The United States Department of Defense (DoD) has been aggressively 
formulating doctrine and policy on the subject since the early 1990s. Various 
amendments and updates, both conceptual and methodical, have been 
introduced into doctrine to keep this form of warfare abreast with continually 
changing trends. The study of this evolution offers guidelines to other coalition 
                                            
1 Samuel B. Griffith, Sun Tzu: The art of War (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 41. 
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partners who may wish to make their own organizations effective and viable by 
incorporating changes to suit their scale and scope of operations.  
B. PURPOSE 
 The 1991 Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm) can be regarded as the first 
example in which U.S. military forces displayed their strength and skill with 
modern precision-guided weapons, brought to the world in real time or near real 
time through modern communications means.2 The reason that people around 
the globe still remember the liberation of Kuwait is that it was a showcase of the 
modern face of war. Modern communication systems and networks not only 
assisted soldiers in the battlefield, but were also telecasting real-time scenes to 
millions of television viewers. This was the first major glimpse of the new digital 
nature of information, heralding the revolution in information technology (IT).  
In 2003, the Second Gulf War (Operation Iraqi Freedom) further reinforced 
the importance of modern technology in maintaining communication links both 
with and within the battle zone. The United States today is not only a leader in IT, 
but also possesses the most recent combat experience of warfare fought in the 
era of the information revolution. Their present-day doctrine on the subject of IW, 
now referred to as information operations (IO), reflects painstaking research and 
conceptual innovation, spanning almost a quarter of a century.  
For military commanders, it is often a better approach to learn from 
contemporary evolutionary trends in the application of warfare than to look for 
revolutionary ideas. Following this approach, the purpose of this thesis is to 
explore information warfare in light of the evolution of U.S. methodologies and to 
draw pertinent lessons for smaller militaries.   
                                            
2 Group Captain Sultan M Hali, “The role of media in war,” Defence Journal .(2000), 
accessed June 5, 2012. http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/aug/role-media-war.htm 
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C. THE NATURE OF INFORMATION WARFARE 
Information warfare, in its most fundamental sense, is the emerging 
warfare area in which future nation-against-nation conflict at the strategic level is 
most likely to occur. IW is also changing the way operational and tactical-level 
combat and military activities are being planned and executed. Interestingly, IW 
may result in “operations other than war” being conducted, especially as it may 
permit a country to achieve important national-security objectives without the 
need for forward deployment of military forces.3  
According to Toffler and Schwartau,4 IW makes it possible to impose our 
will on the enemy by controlling, manipulating, or by prohibiting access to 
information. Therefore, IW may define future warfare and may be the central 
focus in the future of any conflict. Information systems were previously second in 
importance to conventional or kinetic weapons such as aircraft, tanks, ships and 
missiles, but today they are so critical to military operations that it may be more 
effective to attack an opponent’s information system than to destroy his weapons 
platforms. Moreover, all latest weapons and their platforms are information-
intensified as their operations are dependent on information systems. These 
dependencies are going to make information acquisition a key objective for 
today’s military forces. 
Warfare has historically been the domain of nation-states, or, at least, 
groups of displaced people fighting an oppressive government. Now, even small, 
loosely organized groups and individuals can conduct information warfare on an 
array of targets. When reviewing the military’s treatment of information as a 
weapon, it is important to note that IW is much more than using information to aid 
conventional destruction. Warfare is gradually losing its material nature, and 
                                            
3 Air Marshal Raghu Rajan, “Impact of Information Warfare on Aerospace Operations,” IDR 
Issue Vol 26.2 Apr-Jun 2011, accessed June 4, 2012, 
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/interviews/impact-of-information-warfare-on-aerospace-
operation 
4 Daniel Ventre, Information Warfare (London: ISTE Ltd, 2009), 32. 
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information has become an end in itself. As governments, businesses, and 
individuals become increasingly reliant on data storage and movement, the 
potential for serious economic harm resides in the information itself5. Keeping in 
view the increased importance of information and its processing systems, every 
military entity should institute a robust IW infrastructure to be able to leverage 
information when and where appropriate.  
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
1. Scope of the Study 
This thesis will review the literature on IW. A description of frequently used 
lexicon and terminology will be presented to clarify ambiguities associated with 
the theory of IW. Fundamental concepts and definitions from U.S. publications 
will be briefly discussed. Based on this study, an approach to organizing IW 
forces that is feasible for smaller regional militaries will be suggested. 
2. Thesis Organization  
The remainder of this thesis follows the chapter outline below: 
Chapter II provides a historical background on information warfare and its 
distinction from information operations. The thesis clarifies the relationship 
between information warfare and other current terminologies, such as command-
and-control warfare (C2W), information campaigns, and perception management. 
Chapter III explains the United States DoD interpretation and 
metamorphous of the term “information warfare” and its related capabilities and 
characteristics.  
Chapter IV looks into the way the U.S. DoD and armed forces have 
implemented IO across their departments. Since the present model has evolved 
over a period of approximately twenty years, a grassroots examination is made 
                                            
5 Carter Gilmer, “The Future of Information Warfare,” SANS Institute (2001) GSEC Practical 
Assignment Version 1.2f 
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by this study. This chapter also looks at tactical, operational, and strategic 
requirements that have forced a number of conceptual and doctrinal changes in 
IW.  
Chapter V presents guidelines for developing nations that are useful for 
implementing IW in their policy and strategy planning and execution. A simple 
model is presented that illustrates the promise of IW capabilities in the modern 
era.  
Chapter VI presents summary of the study, provides recommendations for 
establishing an effective IW capability, and concludes the thesis.  
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II. CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE TERM “IW” 
A. SCOPE/DIMENSIONS OF IW  
The vast scope of information warfare is clearly demonstrated by the 
following comments by Edwin Leigh Armistead6:   
The Information Age is an era of manipulated images, both visual 
and auditory. Nations, groups and individuals are all attempting to 
manage the message that you see, and they will often conduct their 
information campaign in a similar manner—whether they are 
‘selling’ a soft drink or a global terrorist threat. The whole idea is to 
influence the ‘wetware’ of the consumer or the public, to get them to 
believe in a product or cause. The process is to supply information 
that molds the recipient’s knowledge and expectations which then 
results in behavior meeting the goals of the information sender.  
IW deals with information and information systems; hence, its scope is not 
solely limited to the military sphere of application. This, at first glance, does not 
appear to conform with the U.S. approach to information operations (since the 
term “IW” no longer appears in U.S. doctrine and is replaced with “IO”). Under 
this approach, warfare capabilities and tools should not be applied to neutral or 
friendly populations or domestic audiences outside a combat zone, during a state 
of peace or conflict. Abandoning the term “IW” in favor of “IO” provides the 
flexibility and leverage of including capabilities like public affairs (PA) and 
defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD) to dovetail with other elements of 
IO. It is important to note here that, per the latest definition in Joint Publication 1–
02, IO falls under the “military” element of national power among the four 
recognized elements known commonly as DIME: diplomatic, informational, 
military, and economic power, as shown in Figure 1. From this standpoint, the  
 
 
                                            
6 Edwin Leigh Armistead
 
and Thomas Murphy, “The Evolution of Information Operations 
Contracts across the DoD: Growth Opportunities for Academic Research” (Proceedings of the 2nd 
International Conference on Information Warfare and Security, 8–9 March 2007). 
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term “IO” (or “IW” for those outside the U.S. who may use the term) cannot be 
used outside the sphere of military operations; this seriously limits the scope and 
potential that IO offers.  
 
 
Note: The national elements of power are typically recognized in the U.S. as 
diplomatic, informational, military and economic. Many writers include law 
enforcement and intelligence capabilities in the lineup. However, national 
security strategy reflects the first four only. 
Figure 1.  National Elements of Power7 
The importance of applying IO over a broader scheme of operations is 
evident in the following excerpt from U.S. Congressman Rob Simmons: 
I see IO as the foundation for revitalizing our national power and 
our national prosperity. I see IO as central to both our effectiveness 
overseas in projecting American values and protecting American 
interests, and I see IO as central to our homeland defense in as 
much as it helps to educate our citizens about global realities, and 
                                            
7 Richard J. Josten, “Strategic Communication: Key Enabler for Elements of National Power,” 
IOSPHERE (Joint Information Operations Center), Summer 2006. Accessed November 2, 2012. 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/iosphere_summer06_josten.pdf 
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helps our citizens to communicate bottom-up dots through 
Community Intelligence Centers and networks.8 
In a general sense, the desire for dominance in the commercial/corporate 
sector, whether on an international scale or dealing only with domestic 
competition within a country, can shape IW into many forms, as driven by “ends, 
ways, and means.9“ At a strategic level, IW can be waged, for example, against a 
hostile nation to ruin its national economy. This mode of attack may prove more 
devastating and damaging than otherwise possible through the employment of 
conventional military forces. Similarly, grievances or deprivations may motivate a 
group of antagonists to initiate a campaign against a government with the help of 
few personal computers. IW is available to hackers who can target across 
borders against any organization, at their discretion. Thus, in order to understand 
IW, a brief look from the civil and military perspectives is helpful.  
B. NON-MILITARY/CIVIL PERSPECTIVE OF IW 
The proper development of IW capability can support policies, processes 
and strategies of traditional hierarchical militaries and governments, as well as 
business organizations and their growth. On one hand, IW is getting increasingly 
involved in management and operational issues involving combat activities; on 
the other, it is being utilized and modeled to address any large-scale, complex 
organization and its mission. This is because the general requirements for 
                                            
8 Rob Simmons, “Information Operations: All Information, All Languages, All the Time.” 






9 Clausewitz described the relationship of ends, ways, and means in terms of a “paradoxical 
trinity” which has been interpreted as the government, military, and people. The government is 
responsible for defining the desired political environment at the conclusion of conflict (the ends), 
the military is primarily responsible for developing the strategy (the ways), and the people, as 
represented by Congress, provide the will and resources (the means). This excerpt is taken from, 
Bruce J. Reider, “Strategic Realignment: Ends, Ways, And Means In Iraq,” the U.S. Army 
professional writing collection. Accessed on November 2, 2012. 
Http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume6/february_2008/2_08_3.html 
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success are often very similar for a defense force or a business, giving 
information warfare a broader application beyond typical military-combat 
operations10. 
The IW methodology normally adopted in the civilian sector is mainly 
dependent upon the target audience11. Based on the target audience, IW falls 
into three classifications:12: 
1. Personal Information Warfare 
This is known as Class I information warfare and is aimed against 
individual privacy, involving attacks on personal and confidential data.  
2. Commercial Information Warfare:  
This is known as Class II information warfare and involves industrial 
espionage and broadcasting of false information against business rivals using the 
Internet.  
3. Global Information Warfare 
This is known as Class III information warfare and is aimed at countries, 
political alliances and spheres of influence, global economic forces, sensitive 
national information systems and infrastructure.” 
C. THE MILITARY PERSPECTIVE OF IW 
1. Distinguishing IW from IO 
The terms “information warfare” and “information operations” are 
frequently used together without discretion and are normally considered 
interchangeable. To some people, “information warfare” is a generic term that 
                                            
10 Armistead
 
and Murphy, op. cit. 
11 Target audience (also called TA) is defined by U.S. Joint Publication 1–02 as an individual 
or group selected for influence. 
12 Amit Grover, “Cyber War’s Final Frontier: Network Centric Warfare Framework,” accessed 
June 25, 2012, http://www.itffroc.org/articles/ag_cyberwar.pdf	
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represents all forms of struggle for control and superiority concerning information. 
This perception or impression emanates from the literal meaning of the term 
“information warfare.” In the context of military applications, these terms have 
been defined with a clear description of purpose and capabilities to facilitate 
proper planning, training, and execution. It is important for the practitioner of 
information and information systems to understand both terms conceptually 
without confusion.  
From the available literature, it is evident that “information warfare” is the 
older of the two terms, emerging in the late 1970s with command and control 
warfare (C2W) as war-fighting constructs integrating several diverse capabilities. 
These further evolved into “information operations,” recognizing the role of 
information as an element of power across the spectrum of peace, conflict, and 
war13. 
In the United States, “information operations” is the superior strategic 
term, integrating various capabilities and activities such as information warfare14. 
Though the definition of IO has undergone many revisions and updates to date, a 
1998 JP 3–13 defined it in a very broad sense. Per this publication, information 
operations involve actions taken to affect adversary information and information 
systems while defending one’s own information and information systems. In the 
same year, information warfare was viewed as an extension of an overall IO 
effort pitched specifically when a state of peace is no longer present between or 
among countries. Information warfare was defined as information operations 
conducted during times of crisis or conflict (including war) to achieve or promote 
specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries.15 The latest 
definition of IO specifically associates it with military operations only (no civil 
                                            
13 U.S. Army War College Information Operations Primer November 2011  
14 Manuel W. Wik, “Revolution in Information Affairs,” Tactical and Strategic Implications of 
Information Warfare and Information Operations: 14, accessed on July 3, 2012, doi: 10.1.1.196 
15 JP 3–13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 9 
October 1998): I-1 
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interpretation or application) and lays more emphasis on integration, 
synchronization, and coordination of various information-related capabilities. “The 
ultimate goal of information operations is to impact human decision making. 
Ultimately, it could be the struggle of minds in order to become the master of a 
situation.”16 
 
Figure 2.  Differences in scope between IW and IO 
It is relevant to review the range of military operations to better understand 
the ongoing discussion of the applicability of IW and IO across different states. 
The following table is helpful in understanding the spectrum of environments in 
which military operations may occur. 
 
                                            
16 Manuel W. Wik, “Revolution in Information Affairs,” Tactical and Strategic Implications of 




















 Strikes and raid 
 Peace enforcement 












 Disaster relief 
 Civil support 
 Peace building 
 Nation assistance 
Note:  The states of peacetime, conflict and war could all exist at 
once in the theater commander’s strategic environment. He can 
respond to requirements with a wide range of military operations. 
Noncombat operations might occur during war, just as some 
military operations other than war (MOOTW) might require 
combat. 
 
Table 1.   The Range of Military Operations17 
From this discussion, it is evident that the realm of information operations 
is much larger than information warfare. From the standpoint that the ultimate 
goal of operations in the military is its ability to contribute to the traditional military 
                                            
17 U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 100–7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations, 






















mission of fighting and winning the nation’s wars, information operations connect 
ultimately to information warfare. However, it is pertinent to note that the U.S. 
DoD has officially discontinued the use of term “information warfare” and 
removed it from joint IO doctrine and related publications18. Today, information 
operations deal exclusively with all the attributes information may have, whether 
in peacetime or hostilities. Generally, peace operations nowadays are becoming 
part and parcel of a military’s charter of duties on a global level. In these 
“operations other than war” (OOTW), information operations are increasingly 
finding an important role to play in enhancing the success rate of such missions.  
2. The Targets of Information Warfare19 
In an information environment,20 humans and information infrastructure 
are both prime targets of IW. The widely used term information infrastructure 
refers to the complex of sensing, communicating, storing, and computing 
elements that comprise a defined information network conveying analog and 
digital voice, data, imagery, and multimedia data. The “complex” includes the 
physical facilities (computers, links, relays, and node devices), network standards 
and protocols, applications and software, the personnel who maintain the 
infrastructure, and the information itself. The infrastructure is the object of both 
attack and defense; it provides the delivery vehicle for the information weapons 
of the attacker while forming the warning net and barrier of defense for the 
defender. Understanding of the physical and abstract structure of the 
infrastructure is therefore essential for both the defender and the target alike. 
Three infrastructure categories are most commonly identified. 
 The global information infrastructure (GII) includes the international 
complex of broadcast communications, telecommunications, and 
                                            
18 U.S.JP 3–13, Information Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 13 February 2006): iii 
19 Information in this section is taken from Edward Waltz, Information Warfare Principles and 
Operations (Norwood: Artech House, 1998), 173–174. 
20 Information environment is defined in U.S. JP 1–02as ‘.the aggregate of individuals, 
organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information’. 
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computers that provide global communications, commerce, media, 
navigation, and network services between NIls.  
 The national information infrastructure (NIl) includes the subset of 
the GIl within the nation, and internal telecommunications, 
computers, intranets, and other information services not connected 
to the GII. The NIl is directly dependent upon national electrical 
power to operate, and the electrical power grid is controlled by 
components of the NII. The GII can be described as the 
interconnection layer between NIIs. 
 The defense information infrastructure (DII) includes the 
infrastructure owned and maintained by the military (and 
intelligence) organizations of the nation for purposes of national 
security. The DII includes command, control, communications, and 
computation components as well as dedicated administration 
elements. These elements are increasingly integrated to the NIl and 
GII to use commercial services for global reach but employ 
information security (INFOSEC) methods to provide appropriate 
levels of security. 
D. INFORMATION CAMPAIGN IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS VIS-A-
VIS PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT 
“Information campaign”21 is a term frequently used in the military and 
commercial worlds. It is pertinent to describe its conceptual description and 
relevance to information operations, and how it differs from perception 
management. There is no proper definition of this terminology in U.S. DoD 
publications, but since its use is common in print and electronic media, its proper 
context should be clear to military personnel. In addition, the distinction between 
perception management and an IO information campaign is not readily apparent, 
and boundaries between these terminologies seem to be blurring.  
Joint Publication 1–02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms, defines perception management as: 
… actions to convey and/or deny selected information and 
indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, 
and objective reasoning as well as to intelligence systems and 
                                            
21 JP 1–02 defines campaign as a series of related major operations aimed at achieving 
strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. 
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leaders at all levels to influence official estimates, ultimately 
resulting in foreign behaviors and official actions favorable to the 
originator’s objectives. In various ways, perception management 
combines truth projection, operations security, cover and deception, 
and psychological operations.22 
 
Figure 3.  Perception management23 
As a matter of concept, information campaigns are an important technique 
employed in information operations where the intent is to disseminate true and 
unclassified information about military operations and create a reliable 
information environment for external audiences. Such an effort is extremely 
helpful in countering propaganda and disinformation generated by foreign 
governments and factions that control or intimidate the media and try to distort 
the overall picture. On the other hand, perception management allows the use of 
falsehood and deception (as part of its definition) where the purpose is to get the 
other side to believe what one wishes it to believe, whatever the truth may be.  
                                            
22 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Joint Publication (JP) 1–02, Department of Defense Dictionary 
of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 12 April 2001, as amended 
through 13 June 2007) page 407.  
23 Lieutenant Colonel Garry J. Beavers, U.S. Army, Retired , “Defining the Information 
Campaign,” Military Review November-December 2005: 80 
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Potentially all IO capabilities, including, but not limited to, PA, PSYOPs, 
and counterpropaganda, can contribute to an information campaign. Information 
assurance figures in the mix by protecting and defending information and 
information systems. As part of an information campaign, OPSEC would identify, 
control, and protect unclassified evidence associated with sensitive operations 
and activities.24 These components are shown in mosaic form in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.  Components of an information campaign25 
Information campaigns have played a significant role throughout history in 
the fulfillment of military objectives at strategic and operational levels of warfare. 
Their future role will potentially increase and extend to tactical forces. Modern 
warfare banks heavily on influencing audiences both internal and external. In 
today’s world, where scores of information channels and networks are readily 
available to target audiences, deception and perception-shaping efforts, without  
 
 
                                            
24 Ibid., 82 
25 Ibid., 81 
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careful consideration, planning, and coordination, can be futile and even risky. 
Hence, detailed planning and coordination are of paramount importance in every 







III. U.S. JOINT AND SERVICES LEVEL INTERPRETATION OF 
INFORMATION OPERATIONS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
As described earlier, the U.S. DoD has carried out extensive research and 
doctrinal work in the field of IO and information-related capabilities. That effort is 
still ongoing, with continual revisions and modifications of the literature and 
updating of the organizational framework for implementing IO. A study of U.S. 
DoD publications on the subject of, or relating to, IO provides not only the insight 
on the evolutionary process in this field, but also gives the extent and depth of 
possible avenues that might play a role in warfare within the information realm.  
B. JOINT FORCES COMMAND PERSPECTIVE ON IO 
1. Important Terminology Used in IO Literature 
Before venturing into the definition of IO, it is important to understand 
some important operational terminologies often encountered in IO literature. 
Operations are often characterized by using terms such as domains, 
environment, effects, targets, and capabilities.  
Our universe consists of three primary dimensions: physical (including the 
terrestrial, atmospheric, marine, space, and electromagnetic environments, as 
well as the tangible components contained within them), cognitive (the single and 
collective consciousness that exists in the minds of individuals),
 
and informational 
(existing within both the physical and cognitive dimensions and hosting the 
creation, manipulation, storage, and sharing of data, and containing the 
information itself).26 This last dimension actually links the physical real world with 
the human consciousness of the cognitive dimension, both as a source of input 
(stimulus, senses, etc.) and to convey output (intent, direction, decisions, etc.).27 
                                            
26 Timothy P. Franz, Matthew F. Durkin, Paul D. Williams, Richard A. Raines, Robert F. Mills, 
Defining Information Operations Forces, Air & Space Power Journal Summer 2007: 54. 
27 Information Operations Primer, U.S. Army War College, November 2011. 
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The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and 
systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.28 Due to the 
inherent nature of the information environment, it exists in and extends to all 
interrelated physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions. Similarly, the 
information environment pervades and transcends the boundaries of physical 
dimensions (i.e., land, sea, air, and space domains) and encompasses 
cyberspace in itself. This environment is of particular importance in IO, as a 
variety of capabilities is employed to impact the above-mentioned three 
dimensions, partially or fully.  
An operational domain represents a portion of one or more primary 
domains chosen for a specific national or military operation. Essentially, it is an 
artificially defined (in that it is defined by humans), bounded area of the universe. 
A pertinent example is cyberspace. The cyberspace operational domain is 
“characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic environment to 
store, modify, and exchange data and information via networked systems and 
associated physical infrastructure.”29 Per U.S. joint publication (JP) 1–02, 
cyberspace is defined as “a global domain within the information environment 
consisting of the interdependent network of information technology 
infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer 
systems, and embedded processors and controllers”30. Within any operational 
domain, capabilities achieve effects against specific targets.31 Leveraging joint 
doctrine, we define a target as “an entity or object considered for possible 
engagement or other action.”32 Using the same reference, we define an effect as 
                                            
28 Joint Publication (JP) 1–02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 8 November 2010, as amended through 15 July 2012): 152. 
29 Franz op. cit., 54–55. 
30 Joint Publication (JP) 1–02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 8 November 2010, as amended through 15 July 2012): 80. 
31 Franz op. cit., 54–55. 
32 Joint Publication (JP) 1–02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 8 November 2010, as amended through 15 July 2012): 310. 
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“the physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of 
actions, or another effect. Effect can also be a change to a condition, behavior, or 
degree of freedom.”33 Finally, we draw upon the DoD directive to define 
capabilities as “the ability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards 
and conditions through a combination of means and ways across doctrine, 
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and 
facilities (DOTMLPF) to perform a set of tasks to execute a specified course of 
action.”34 
2. Defining IO 
In a recently amended JP 1–02, IO is defined as “the integrated 
employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in 
concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the 
decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our 
own.”35 This definition was introduced in a U.S. Secretary of Defense 
memorandum issued on January 25, 2011. 
This definition represents a marked shift in the approach toward IO. It is 
now regarded more as a combination of capabilities, individual and diverse in 
nature, that are required to be employed together in a coherent manner under 
the umbrella of IO. Per the latest instructions, it is not practical to label or tag any 
particular capability or set of capabilities as belonging exclusively to IO like a 
proprietary feature. IO has been introduced this time as more of an integrating 
function, more emphatically and explicitly than ever before. The new policy also  
 
                                            
33 Joint Publication (JP) 1–02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 8 November 2010, as amended through 15 July 2012): 101. 
34 Department of Defense Directive (DODD) number 7045.20, Capability Portfolio 
Management, September 25, 2008: 8. 
35 Joint Publication (JP) 1–02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 8 November 2010, as amended through 15 July 2012): 152. 
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focuses on the distribution of the oversight responsibility of the core capabilities 
among various entities in order to better address the issues of management, 
funding, training and resources.  
To appreciate the notable differences in the new definition as compared to 
older versions, it is logical to restate the previous definitions. In the 2006 edition, 
JP 3–13 described IO as “the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), 
computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military 
deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified 
supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp 
adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.”36 
In an even earlier 1998 edition of JP 3–13, IO was defined as “actions taken to 
affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own 
information and information systems.”37 It may be noted here that the latest 
definition is an improved and modified description of the same idea introduced in 
this 1998 definition. The new definition recognizes employment of IO tools and 
resources in military operations only and limits its use to the military only. 
Moreover, like the 1998 definition, the new approach recognizes the fact that an 
IO operation may not require all of the capabilities to be put in or brought 
together to achieve success. The selection of the capabilities is situation 
dependent and to be determined by the military commander according to his or 
her appreciation of the need and situation. At times a single, or few, capabilities 
can be sufficient to fulfill the objective, and any attempt to be more inclusive can 
ruin the outcome instead.  
C. CAPABILITIES INVOLVED IN IO 
As highlighted earlier, information operations are the right combination of 
various capabilities according to the dictates of the information environment. 
                                            
36 JP 3–13, Information Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 13 February 2006): I-1. 
37 JP 3–13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 9 
October 1998): GL-7. 
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Some capabilities have been in existence and use since the dawn of warfare; 
others are the result of technological innovations and advancements. The U.S. 
DoD described these capabilities as core, supporting, and related, based on their 
relative importance in achieving the supreme objective of affecting the decision-
making capability of the adversary (an overview of these capabilities is shown in 
Figure 5). It is due to this nature of information operations that synchronization 
and coordination become the most important attribute of planning and execution. 
The following is a general description of these capabilities. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Capabilities involved in IO 
1. Core Capabilities    
IO as defined in the 2006 joint publication consists of five core capabilities: 
military information support operations (MISO, previously known as psychological 
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operations or PSYOPs38), military deception (MILDEC), operations security 
(OPSEC), electronic warfare (EW), and computer-network operations (CNO, now 
commonly referred to as cyber). Of the five, PSYOPs/ MISO, OPSEC, and 
MILDEC have played a major part in military operations for many centuries. In 
this modern age, they have been joined first by EW and most recently by 
CNO/Cyber. Together, these five capabilities, used in conjunction with supporting 
and related capabilities, provide the JFC with the principal means of influencing 
an adversary and other target audiences (TAs) by enabling the joint forces 
freedom of operation in the information environment.39  
2. Supporting Capabilities  
Capabilities supporting IO include information assurance (IA), physical 
security, physical attack, counterintelligence (CI), human intelligence 
(HUMINT)40 and combat camera (COMCAM). These are either directly or 
indirectly involved in the information environment and contribute to effective IO. 
They should be integrated and coordinated with the core capabilities, but can 
also serve other wider purposes.41  
3. Related Capabilities 
There are three military functions specified as related capabilities for IO: 
public affairs (PA), civil–military operations (CMO), and defense support to public 
diplomacy (DSPD). These capabilities make significant contributions related to IO 
and must always be coordinated and integrated with the core and supporting 
information operations capabilities. However, their primary purpose and rules 
                                            
38 The definition included in JP 3–13 (published 13 February 2006) has been superseded by 
the U.S. SecDef Memo 12401–10 (25 January 2011). The term psychological operations 
(PSYOP) has been replaced by military information support operations (MISO). 
39 JP 3–13, Information Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 13 February 2006): II-1. 
40 HUMINT has been added in supporting capabilities of IO through Department of Defense 
Directive (DODD) 3600.01 Information Operations, 14 August 2006, Change 1 incorporated 23 
May 2011. 
41 JP 3–13, Information Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 13 February 2006): II-5. 
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under which they operate must not be compromised by IO. This requires 
additional care and consideration in the planning and conduct of IO. For this 
reason, the PA and CMO staffs, particularly, must work in close coordination with 
the IO planning staff.42  
4. Core Capabilities in IO 
a. Military Information Support Operations (MISO) 
These are planned operations to convey selected truthful 
information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, 
motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of their governments, 
organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of MISO is to induce or 
reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. 
MISO are a vital part of the broad range of U.S. activities to influence foreign 
audiences and are the only DoD operations authorized to influence foreign TAs 
directly through the use of radio, print, and other media. MISO personnel advise 
the supported commander on methods to capitalize on the psychological impacts 
of every aspect of force employment and how to develop a strategy for 
developing and planning the dissemination of specific MISO programs, to 
achieve the overall campaign objectives.43 
b. Military Deception (MILDEC)  
MILDEC is described as those actions executed to deliberately 
mislead adversary decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, 
and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or 
inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly force’s 
mission. MILDEC and OPSEC are complementary activities—MILDEC seeks to 
encourage incorrect analysis, causing the adversary to arrive at specific false 
deductions, while OPSEC seeks to deny real information to an adversary, and 
                                            
42 Ibid., II-8. 
43 Ibid., II-1. 
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prevent correct deduction of friendly plans. To be effective, a MILDEC operation 
must be susceptible to adversary collection systems and “seen” as credible to the 
enemy commander and staff. A plausible approach to MILDEC planning is to 
employ a friendly course of action (COA) that can be executed by friendly forces 
and that adversary intelligence can verify. However, MILDEC planners must not 
fall into the trap of ascribing to the adversary particular attitudes, values, and 
reactions that “mirror image” likely friendly actions in the same situation, i.e., 
assuming that the adversary will respond or act in a particular manner based on 
how we would respond.44 
c. Operations Security 
OPSEC is a process of identifying critical information and 
subsequently analyzing friendly actions and other activities to identify what 
friendly information is necessary for the adversary to have sufficiently accurate 
knowledge of friendly forces and intentions; deny adversary decision makers 
critical information about friendly forces and intentions; and cause adversary 
decision makers to misjudge the relevance of known critical friendly information 
because other information about friendly forces and intentions remain secure.45  
d. Electronic Warfare 
EW refers to any military action involving the use of 
electromagnetic (EM) and directed energy to control the EM spectrum or to 
attack the adversary. EW includes three major subdivisions: electronic attack 
(EA), electronic protection (EP), and electronic warfare support (ES). EA involves 
the use of EM energy, directed energy, or anti-radiation weapons to attack 
personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or 
destroying adversary combat capability. EP ensures the friendly use of the EM 
spectrum. ES consists of actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an 
                                            
44 Ibid., II-2. 
45 Ibid., II-3. 
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operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize 
sources of intentional and unintentional radiated EM energy for the purpose of 
immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning, and conduct of future 
operations. ES provides information required for decisions involving EW 
operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and 
homing. ES data can be used to produce SIGINT, provide targeting for electronic 
or other forms of attack, and produce measurement and signature intelligence 
(MASINT). SIGINT and MASINT can also provide battle damage assessment 
(BDA) and feedback on the effectiveness of the overall operational plan.46 
e. Computer Network Operations 
CNO is one of the latest capabilities developed in support of military 
operations. CNO stems from the increasing use of networked computers and 
supporting IT infrastructure systems by military and civilian organizations. CNO, 
along with EW, is used to attack, deceive, degrade, disrupt, deny, exploit, and 
defend electronic information and infrastructure. For the purposes of military 
operations, CNO are divided into computer-network attack (CNA), computer-
network defense (CND), and related computer-network exploitation (CNE) 
enabling operations. CNA consists of actions taken through the use of computer 
networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident on computers 
and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves. CND 
involves actions taken through the use of computer networks to protect, monitor, 
analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within DoD information 
systems and computer networks. CND actions not only protect DoD systems 
from an external adversary, but also from exploitation from within, and are now a 




                                            
46 Ibid., II-4. 
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intelligence collection capabilities conducted through the use of computer 
networks to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems 
or networks47.  
D. INFORMATION OPERATIONS SUPPORTING CAPABILITIES 
1. Information Assurance 
IA is defined as measures that protect and defend information and 
information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes providing for restoration of 
information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction 
capabilities. IA is necessary to gain and maintain information superiority. IA 
requires a defense-in-depth approach that integrates the capabilities of people, 
operations, and technology to establish multilayer and multidimensional 
protection to ensure survivability and mission accomplishment. IA must assume 
that access can be gained to information and information systems from inside 
and outside DoD-controlled networks48.  
2. Physical Security 
Physical security is that part of security concerned with physical measures 
designed to safeguard personnel, to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, 
installations, material, and documents, and to safeguard them against espionage, 
sabotage, damage, and theft. The physical security process includes determining 
vulnerabilities to known threats, applying appropriate deterrent, control and 
denial safeguarding techniques and measures, and responding to changing 
conditions.49 
 
                                            
47 Ibid., II-5. 
48 Ibid., II-6. 
49 Ibid., II-6. 
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3. Physical Attack 
The concept of attack is fundamental to military operations. Physical 
attack disrupts, damages, or destroys adversary targets through destructive 
power. Physical attack can also be used to create or alter adversary perceptions 
or drive an adversary to use certain exploitable information systems.50 This term 
has been modified in Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3600.01 (after 
incorporation of change 1 on 23 May 2011) as physical (kinetic attack) that may 
be employed alone or integrated with non-kinetic attack options to influence or 
disrupt adversary decision makers or groups and provide support for full-
spectrum dominance. 
4. Counterintelligence 
CI consists of information gathered and activities conducted to protect 
against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations 
conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign 
organizations, foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.51  
5. Human Intelligence 
HUMINT and related intelligence activities are those deriving information 
collected from human sources, and shall be used to support IO. For collection of 
information that may endanger the source or the collector, then the information 
shall only be collected by trained and certified HUMINT collectors who are 
assigned to organizations with a mission to collect HUMINT in response to 
validated intelligence requirements. The direction and control of HUMINT 
activities is an inherently governmental function and may only be performed by 
USG civilian or military personnel.52 
                                            
50 Ibid., II-7. 
51 Ibid., II-7. 
52 Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3600.01 Information Operations, 14 August 
2006, Change 1 incorporated 23 May 2011: 3. 
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6. Combat Camera 
The COMCAM mission is to provide the OSD, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the military departments, the combatant commands, and 
the joint task force (JTF) with an imagery capability in support of operational and 
planning requirements across the range of military operations. COMCAM is 
responsible for rapid development and dissemination of products that support 
strategic and operational IO objectives. The COMCAM program belongs to the 
Defense Visual Information Directorate, which falls under the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Public Affairs. When deployed, operational control of COMCAM 
forces can be delegated to any echelon of command at the discretion of the joint 
force commander (JFC) and subordinate commanders. COMCAM may be 
coordinated by the IO staff at the JFC, component, and subordinate unit levels. 
Most large JTF organizations will have a joint COMCAM management team 
assigned to manage COMCAM and to assist in the movement of imagery. 
Additionally, there are usually one or more joint or component-specific COMCAM 
teams assigned to the theater. These component teams may be assigned to 
special-operations forces (SOF) or other specific units.53 
E. INFORMATION-OPERATIONS-RELATED CAPABILITIES 
1. Public Affairs 
PA are those public-information, command-information, and community-
relations activities directed toward both external and internal audiences with 
interest in DoD. PA is essential for joint forces information superiority, and 
credible PA operations are necessary to support the commander’s mission and 
maintain essential public liaisons. PA’s principal focus is to inform domestic and 
international audiences of joint operations to support combatant command public 
information needs.54 
                                            
53 JP 3–13, Information Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 13 February 2006): II-8. 
54 Ibid., II-8. 
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2. Civil–Military Operations 
CMO are the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, 
or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental 
civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace. They are 
conducted across the range of military operations to address root causes of 
instability, assist in reconstruction after conflict or disaster, or may be conducted 
independent of other military operations to support U.S. national security 
objectives. CMO can occur in friendly, neutral, or hostile operational areas to 
facilitate military operations and achieve U.S. objectives. CMO may include 
performance by military forces of activities and functions that are normally the 
responsibility of local, regional, or national government. These activities may 
occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. CMO may be 
performed by designated civil affairs (CA), by other military forces, or by a 
combination of CA and other forces.55 
3. Defense Support to Public Diplomacy 
DSPD consists of activities and measures taken by DoD components, not 
solely in the area of IO, to support and facilitate public diplomacy (PD) efforts of 
the USG. DoD contributes to PD, which includes those overt international 
information activities of the USG designed to promote U.S. foreign policy 
objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and 
opinion makers and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and 
institutions and their counterparts abroad. When approved, MISO assets may be 
employed in support of DSPD as part of security cooperation initiatives or in 
support of U.S. embassy PD programs. Much of the operational level IO activity 
conducted in any theater will be directly linked to PD objectives. DSPD requires 
coordination with both the interagency and among DoD components.56 
 
                                            
55 Ibid., II-10. 
56 Ibid., II-10. 
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F. COMPARATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF IO TERMS IN U.S. 
DOCTRINE: USAF FOCUS ON INFLUENCE OPS AND TECHNICAL 
CAPABILITIES 
After a brief look at the capabilities involved in IO as per the description of 
U.S. joint doctrine, it is beneficial to review differences and commonalities in 
definitions and characteristics of IO capabilities found within DoD, joint, and 
service-level doctrines. One of the notable differences can be observed in the 
U.S. Air Force’s doctrinal approach toward IO, which refers to influence 
operations, electronic-warfare operations, and network-warfare operations. 
Influence operations is the employment of capabilities to affect behaviors, protect 
operations, communicate the commander’s intent, and project accurate 
information to achieve desired effects across the cognitive domain. These effects 
should result in differing behavior or a change in the adversary decision cycle, 
which aligns with the commander’s objectives. They should influence adversary 
decision making, communicate the military perspective, manage perceptions, 
and promote behaviors conducive to friendly objectives. Counterpropaganda 
operations, psychological operations (PSYOPs), military deception (MILDEC), 
operations security (OPSEC), counterintelligence (CI) operations, and public-
affairs (PA) operations are the military capabilities of influence operations.57 The 
term “computer-network operations” as used in joint publications is analogous to 
“network-warfare operations” (NW Ops) in Air Force doctrine. NW Ops are the 
integration of the military capabilities of network attack (NetA), network defense 
(NetD), and network warfare support (NS)58. Air Force doctrine also groups 
certain capabilities like IA under the realm of integrated-control enablers (ICE). 
ICEs are critical capabilities required to execute successful air, space, and 
information operations and produce integrated effects for the joint fight. These 
include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), network operations 
(NetOps), predictive battlespace awareness (PBA), and precision navigation and 
                                            
57 Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2–5, Information Operations, 11 January 2005, 9. 
58 Ibid., 19. 
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timing (PNT). NetOps further encompasses IA, system and network 
management, and information dissemination management.59 These 
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Counter-deception  N/A  N/A  Supporting 
Capability 
N/A 
*N/A = term not referred to in core doctrine document 
Sources: Joint Publication 3–13, Information Operations, 13 February 2006, II-1 through II-9; Air 
Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2–5, Information Operations, 11 January 2005, 5–25; Field 
Manual 3–13, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 28 
November 2003, 1–14, 2–7, 2–8; and Navy Warfare Publication 3–13, Navy Information 
Operations, 2003, 13 and 2–6. 
Table 2.   Common Information-Operations Terms60 
G. THE U.S. NAVY’S MOVE TOWARD INFORMATION DOMINANCE 
What all these potential adversaries—from terrorist cells to rogue 
nations to rising powers—have in common is that they have 
learned that it is unwise to confront the United States directly on 
conventional military terms. The United States cannot take its 
current dominance for granted and needs to invest in the programs, 
platforms, and personnel that will ensure that dominance’s 
persistence. 
U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, January 2009 
The U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations officially established the U.S. 
Fleet Cyber Command (FCC) and re-commissioned the U.S. 10th Fleet on 
January 29, 2010. FCC and the 10th Fleet were created as part of the CNO’s 
                                            
60 Timothy P. Franz, Matthew F. Durkin, Paul D. Williams, Richard A. Raines, Robert F. Mills, 
Defining Information Operations Forces, Air & Space Power Journal Summer 2007: 56. 
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vision to achieve the integration and innovation necessary for warfighting 
superiority across the full spectrum of military operations in the maritime, 
cyberspace and information domains. This initiative will help raise information to 
the forefront of the Navy’s 21st-century arsenal61. 
The vision of the U.S. Navy’s information dominance is to pioneer, field, 
and employ game-changing capabilities to ensure information dominance over 
adversaries and decision superiority for commander, operational forces, and the 
nation. As a concept, information dominance is the ability to seize and control the 
information domain high ground when, where, and however required for decisive 
competitive advantage across the range of Navy missions. Information 
dominance means freedom of action to maneuver and act—conduct offensive 
and defensive actions, kinetically and non-kinetically—at the intersection of 
maritime, information, and cyberspace domains. At this intersection, the Navy 
exploits deep penetration, expanded maneuver space and information advantage 
to deliver warfighting options and effects.62 As noted in May 2010 by Vice 
Admiral David J, Dorsett, deputy chief of naval operations for information 
dominance, to achieve information dominance, the Navy must radically realign 
warfighting capabilities. It must transition from a Navy that relies on individual 
units managing their own electromagnetic spectrum to fleets and battle forces 
collectively achieving command and control over the electromagnetic spectrum in 
an automated fashion. This will require re-engineering the Navy, its concepts, 
weapons, battle-management systems, and people. 
H. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NAVY’S INFORMATION-DOMINANCE 
CORPS 
We must deliver new concepts and operational capabilities. We’re 
about creating whole warfighting capability based on seamless 
                                            
61 CNO stands up Fleet Cyber Command, Anchor Watch, March 2010: 8 
62 The U.S. Navy Vision for Information Dominance, May 2010: 2–4 retrieved from 
http://www.insaonline.org/assets/files/NavyInformationDominanceVisionMay2010.pdf on October 
22, 2012. 
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networks, integrated sensors and data and analysis delivered to the 
warfighter. 
Adm. Gary Roughead, former U.S. Chief of Naval Operations,  
July 200963 
The former-CNO of the U.S. Navy directed that the Navy be the most 
prominent and dominant service in the areas of intelligence, cyber warfare, 
command and control, electronic warfare, battle management, and knowledge of 
the maritime environment.64 To make possible this aspiration, it was necessary 
to continue breaking down barriers between fields, professions, and skills—and 
ultimately create a dramatically more competent and influential information-
focused work force for the future. To achieve this objective, the ex-CNO took a 
bold step in creating the Information Dominance Corps (IDC). Focusing on unity 
of effort and the capacity to direct a cadre of officers, enlisted, and their civilian 
counterparts, the IDC integrates information professionals (IPs), information 
warfare (IW), naval intelligence, and oceanography, space-cadre officers, and 
cyber-warfare engineers with aviation aerographers mates (AGs), cryptologic 
technicians (CTs), intelligence specialists (ISs), and information technician (IT) 
enlisted personnel, and with civilians in the Navy Defense Civilian Intelligence 
Program65. Figure 6 shows the merger of various cadres in the IDC.  
 
                                            
63 Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, “Making the Navy’s Information 
Dominance Vision a Reality” retrieved from 
http://www.public.navy.mil/spawar/Press/Documents/Publications/1.18.12_AFCEA_Kit_II.pdf on 
October 23, 2012.	 
64 The U.S. Navy Vision for Information Dominance, May 2010: 9 retrieved from 
http://www.insaonline.org/assets/files/NavyInformationDominanceVisionMay2010.pdf on October 
22, 2012. 
65 Cynthia R. Duke, “Bridging the Gap in the Realm of Information Dominance: a Concept of 
Operations for the Naval Postgraduate School Center for Cyber Warfare” Naval Postgraduate 

































































Figure 6.  Communities merged to form the Information  
Dominance Corps (IDC)66 
In creating the IDC, a corps of 45,000 persons, the “main battery” of the 
U.S. Navy has been harnessed. The Navy’s IDC professionals, in junior grades, 
are required to strengthen and deepen their professional skills in their 
communities and subspecialties while obtaining a broader understanding of 
cross-corps disciplines. Senior enlisted, officers, and civilians within the IDC will 
be required to retain depth in specialty and subspecialty areas while broadening 
their professional expertise across information disciplines.67  
 
                                            
66IDC Self Synchronization website, Information Dominance Corps (IDC) retrieved from 
http://www.idcsync.org/about/idc on Oct 18, 2012. 
67 The U.S. Navy Vision for Information Dominance, May 2010: 10. Accessed October 22, 
2012.  http://www.insaonline.org/assets/files/NavyInformationDominanceVisionMay2010.pdf. 
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U.S. Naval leadership is looking to create a set of senior professionals 
who will become increasingly capable of managing and leading across the 
information domain. This will require some alterations to education, training, and 
career paths. The fundamentals will remain the same, but the Navy will be 
placing greater demands on IDC senior leaders. Indeed, expanding one’s 
knowledge and skill is at the very foundation of what it means to become an 
information-dominance professional.68 
I. THE U.S. ARMY’S MOVES TOWARD INFORM-AND-INFLUENCE 
ACTIVITIES 
Army forces conduct unified land operations in populated areas that 
require them to contend with the attitudes and perceptions of many audiences 
within and beyond their area of operations. Field Manual 6–0, Mission Command 
(June 2011) established the new mission-command warfighting function (MC 
WfF) and launched the Army’s evolution of information operations to inform and 
influence activities (IIA). “Inform and influence” activities focus on all audiences 
within the information environment, which include domestic and foreign friendly, 
neutral, adversarial, and enemy. It is also in line with the new definition for IO and 
emerging joint doctrine, as it enables commanders with multiple information-
related capabilities to evaluate and use available internal, or request external, 
resources to inform or influence selected populaces, actors, or audiences to 
support mission objectives. They do this through inform and influence activities—
the integration of designated information-related capabilities in order to 
synchronize themes, messages, and actions with operations to inform U.S. and 
global audiences; influence foreign audiences; and affect adversary and enemy 
decision making.69 The two distinct lines of efforts, i.e., inform and influence, are 
described in Figure 7.  
 
                                            
68 Ibid. 
69 Information Operations Primer, U.S. Army War College, November 2011: 69. 
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Figure 7.  Army Inform-and-Influence Activities70 
Information-related capabilities within inform and influence activities 
include, but are not limited to, the following areas (also depicted in Figure 8).71  
 Public affairs  
 Military information support operations  
 Soldier and leader engagement  
 Combat camera  
 Military deception  
 Cyber electromagnetic activities (electronic warfare, computer 
network operations, network operations, information security)  
 Operations security  
                                            
70 Ibid., 9. 
71 Ibid., 70. 
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 Civil-affairs operations  
 Special technical operations  
 Commander-designated enablers (other) 
 
Figure 8.  Integration of Information-Related Capabilities to affect the  
Information Environment 
Recognizing the importance of operations in cyberspace, draft Army 
doctrine labels CNO and EW capabilities as falling within the newly defined area 






Figure 9.  Army Cyber/Electromagnetic Activities 
Cyber-electromagnetic activities seize, retain, and exploit advantages in 
cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, enabling Army forces to retain 
freedom of action while denying freedom of action to enemies and adversaries. 
Cyber-electromagnetic activities are divided into two lines of effort: cyberspace 
operations and electronic warfare, as described in Figure 4, above. Within these 
two lines of effort are six subcomponents: cyber-network operations, cyber 
warfare, electronic attack, electronic protection, electronic-warfare support, and 
electromagnetic-spectrum operations.72 
 
                                            
72 Ibid., 74. 
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J. THE U.S. MARINE CORPS (USMC’S) APPROACH TO IO 
In general, the U.S. Marine Corps is tasked to provide Marine forces for 
service with combatant commanders. It is essential that these forces be manned, 
trained, and equipped with the means to directly or indirectly affect the behavior 
of hostile actors, friendly and neutral parties/organizations, and potential or 
realized adversaries throughout the full spectrum of conflict. To achieve this, 
Marine forces component commands and subordinate Marine air-ground task 
forces (MAGTFs) must be capable of conducting integrated IO; be postured to 
support and conduct actions necessary to influence adversary information, 
information-system operations, and decision making; and be able to assure, 
protect, and defend similar Marine forces’ capabilities. Without IO capable Marine 
forces, the commander’s requirement to secure, shape, and ultimately condition 
the operational environment can never be fully met.73 
The U.S. Marine Corps Information Operations Program (MCIOP) was 
introduced in June 2008 to provide guidance and a future roadmap on the 
subject of IO.74 It refers to U.S. JP 3–13 as the doctrinal foundation for Marine 
Corps IO, along with U.S. DoD directives on the subject. Per the promulgation 
order, the MCIOP seeks to integrate information operations down to the lowest 
levels of the Marine Corps in order to deny or degrade the ability of hostile and 
non-hostile actors to disseminate their message and, if desired, to modify it to 
USMC benefit while simultaneously preventing those same hostile messages 
from negatively affecting USMC decision-making processes. Integration of IO is 
an essential part of USMC routine operations in the expeditionary and joint 
environments. Properly executed, it can help prevent a crisis or conflict; failing 
prevention, IO can both mitigate adversaries’ actions and enhance our own.75  
                                            
73 Marine Corps Order 3120.10, Marine Corps Information Operations Program (MCIOP), 30 
June 2008: 2. 
74 Ibid.  
75 Ibid.  
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The USMC established the Marine Corps Information Operations 
Command (MCIOC) in 2008.76 The primary mission of the MCIOC is “to provide 
MAGTF commanders and the Marine Corps a responsive and effective full-
spectrum IO planning and PSYOPs delivery capability by means of deployable 
support teams and a comprehensive general support IO reach-back capability in 
order to support the interaction of IO into Marine Corps operations.”77 Though IO 
capabilities recognized by USMC IO doctrine (MCWP 3–40.4, MAGTF 
Information Operations, 9 Jul 2003) is generally aligned with the joint publication, 
the MCIOP exerts more emphasis to train subject-matter experts (SME) in the 
areas of: 
1) Mission planning 
2) Threat and nodal analysis78 
3) Electronic warfare 
4) Military deception 
5) Operations security 
6) Psychological operations 
7) Computer network operations 
8) The supporting capability of combat camera 
9) The related capability of civil military operations 
10) Regional IO target expertise 
K. SUMMARY 
The study of U.S. joint and services IO doctrines provides detailed and 
knowledgeable insight on the philosophy behind IO missions in each service and 
their adopted methodology to effectively employ this facet of warfare. It can be 
                                            
76 Marine Corps Bulletin 5400 of 14 March 2008 (CMC Washington DC CDI TFS 141153Z 
Mar 08, Establishment of MCIOC Phase One). 
77 Attachment I Interservice Support Agreement #M00264–09098–409. Accessed October 
30, 2012. www.quantico.usmc.mil/download.aspx?Path=./Uploads/Files/... 
78 The analysis of the adversary’s C2 system to determine critical and vulnerable nodes is 
called nodal analysis. Reference MCWP 3–40.4, “Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information 
Operations,” July 2003, 1–7. 
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seen from the study that, of late, each military service has distinctly approached 
IO focusing on certain peculiar expertise and capabilities that are most 
supportive to the missions, objectives, and existing competencies of that 
particular service. For instance, the U.S. Army now has a more matured 
approach toward MISO by evolving IO into inform and influence activities (IIA) in 
their doctrine. This is likely a result of their recent combat experiences in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, where the Army was simultaneously engaged in fighting an 
adversary in a foreign country while conducting collaboration, cooperation, and 
confidence building with a less hostile or neutral general local population. The 
U.S. Navy is moving toward information dominance, as defined above, in an 
effort to network together all sensors, irrespective of their operating domains, to 
present the commander or decision maker with a complete informational picture 
of the area of interest. This is part of a logical movement to shift from platform-
centric to information-centric mode of warfare in order to economize assets, 
resources and manpower. The U.S. Air Force doctrine has relatively more 
emphasis on EW and networks (both computer and communications) 
management and protection. Certain organizations have been organized to look 
after these critical aspects of EW and network warfare operations. USAF doctrine 
also talks about ICE, a group of certain key capabilities vital in the gain-and-
exploit tactics used in today’s air battles. The U.S. Marine Corps’ IO doctrine and 
MCIOP are generally aligned to joint publications without any evolutionary 
change in theory or procedure. However, MCIOP highlights certain fields of 
expertise that are relatively more involved in, and critical to, expeditionary 
warfare requirements encountered frequently by the Marines.  
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IV. U.S. JOINT AND SERVICE LEVEL IMPLEMENTATION OF 
INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
IO is not considered merely a force enabler anymore; rather it is an 
important instrument of national power comparable to air power and sea power. 
The U.S. DoD has given an eminent place to IO in all the major armed forces 
organizations, from combatant commands, their sub-unified commands, and 
service components, down to lower-tier military formations. A study of U.S. 
implementation of IO gives a fair amount of knowledge as how to constitute IO 
setup in a military organization and how to disperse human resource in order to 
accrue maximum benefits. Before taking a detailed look at IO-specific 
organizations and manpower management, it is beneficial to take a brief look 
over the general scheme under which U.S. armed forces are organized and 
governed. 
The military organization of the U.S. DoD is composed of the Office of the 
Secretary Defense, Joint79 Chiefs of Staff, Joint Staff, departments of the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force, and nine unified combatant commands. An overall 
organizational diagram of U.S. DoD depicting its major organs is shown in Figure 
10 below. Since U.S. combatant commands are an important component for the 
execution of U.S. military policy, their brief function and organization is covered in 
Appendix A.  
                                            
79 The term ‘joint’ formally defined as, “involving two or more Services of the same nation,” 
and the term ‘combined’ as, “applying to organizations, plans, and operations of two or more 
nations.” This information is taken from U.S. Joint Staff Officers Guide-1997, chapter 2, Joint 




Figure 10.  Military Organization of U.S. DoD80 
B. IO ORGANIZATION AT THE U.S. JOINT-STAFF LEVEL 
1. General 81 
At the joint-staff level in the Pentagon, the deputy director for global 
operations (DDGO J-39) is responsible to the director for operations (DJ-3) and 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Of Staff (CJCS) for providing expertise and 
advice in coordinating joint global operations, to include information operations 
(IO). Appropriate representatives from information-related capabilities as well as 
the special staff, service/functional components, and appropriate national 
                                            
80 This figure has been taken from a presentation prepared by Col Bob Hume on DoD 
Education 2009. Accessed October 31, 2012. 
https://dde.carlisle.army.mil/documents/courses.../ppt/2208-UCP.ppt 
81 Information in this section is taken by abridging details from U.S. Army War College IO 
Primer, November 2011,  127–137. 
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agencies serve as members of the J-39. The DDGO is responsible for IO 
activities, developing joint IO policy and doctrine, and coordinating with the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), combatant commands, services, defense 
agencies, other staff directorates, the intelligence community, and interagency on 
IO issues/actions. In addition, the DDGO is the focal point for all special technical 
operations (STO).  
As of 1 October 2011, The Joint Information Operations Warfare Center 
(JIOWC) became a chairman-controlled activity (CCA) under the supervision of 
the DJ-3. This change has been discussed in detail in the next section. CCAs are 
specialized organizations designed to address unique areas that are of joint 
interest. The JIOWC supports the joint staff and combatant commands in DoD 
efforts to integrate joint information-related capabilities. The director, JIOWC, 
reports to the DJ-3 via the J-39. 
2. Organization82  
The DDGO contains five IO-focused divisions as described in the following 
paragraphs: 
a. Computer Network Operations Division (CNOD) 
CNOD advises the SecDef and CJCS, through the DJ-3, on 
computer network operations. Additionally, CNOD provides analyses and 
recommendations for the integration and synchronization of global cyberspace 
operations, including defense, exploitation and attack; network operations 
(NETOps); and information assurance/cyber security. CNOD also supports 
COCOMS to meet combatant commander requirements and interfaces with the 
U.S. Government Interagency on operational employment and de-confliction of 
military CNO.  
 
                                            
82 Ibid. 
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b. Information Operations Division (IOD) 
IOD facilitates and coordinates special capabilities and electronic 
warfare (EW) for the chairman, in support of all COCOMs, SecDef and select 
interagency partners. Additionally, IOD educates operators to better plan and 
employ military information operations. IOD consists of the following branches: 
combatant command support, plans support, electronic warfare, intelligence 
community liaisons, strategic multi-layer analysis management, IO policy and 
doctrine.  
c. Military Information Support Division (MISD) 
MISD provides expertise and advice on MISO employment to 
achieve national, strategic, and theater military objectives. It develops and 
provides guidance to, and coordinates with, COCOMs and services; reviews 
COCOM operation plan (OPLAN) requirements; develops concepts and prepares 
MISO plans; develops and coordinates joint MISO doctrine; publishes joint MISO 
doctrine; and publishes MISO supplements to the joint strategic capabilities plan 
and staff deployment orders. MISO consists of the following branches: 
geographic combatant command support and program and doctrine.  
d. Special Actions Division (SAD) 
SAD has primary responsibility for MILDEC and will work directly 
with JIOWC/Mission Support Division and with the Defense MILDEC Program 
Office as primary stakeholders to ensure community-wide equities are 
maintained and synchronized. SAD is composed of the support activities branch 
and the tactical-security branch. 
e. Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC) 
Known as Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC) until 2006. 
The JIOWC assists the joint staff in improving DoD ability to meet COCOM 
information-related requirements, improves development of information related 
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capabilities, and ensures operational integration and coherence across COCOMs 
and other DoD activities. The main functions of the center are:  
 Joint IO assessment  
 Joint IO force development 
 Joint operations security 
 Joint military deception 
 Coordinate and integrate DoD IO operational support for joint 
commanders  
Some of the important capabilities provided by JIOWC are: 
 Provides IO subject-matter experts with special emphasis on 
military deception and operations security  
 Maintains a cadre of intelligence professionals tightly focused on 
the IO problem set 
 Maintains a habitual working relationship with the IO staffs of the 
combatant commanders and service elements 
 Provides focused and tailored IO planning products  
C. REORGANIZATION OF IO IN THE U.S. DOD83 
In order to address questions relating to roles and missions, definitions, 
management, resources, training and education in the areas of strategic 
communication (SC) and IO, the U.S. Secretary of Defense ordered a SC and IO 
front-end assessment (FEA) in 2010. Based on this assessment, on October 1, 
2010, the principal staff-advisor function and responsibility for IO oversight and 
management moved from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]). The Secretary of Defense 
directed that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), at the joint force 
level, will reorganize joint force IO development and management by assigning 
proponency for joint IO to the joint staff. Furthermore, responsibilities for 
individual capabilities of IO have been assigned to the following organizations:  
 
                                            
83 Information in this section is taken from U.S. Secretary of Defense Memorandum 
“Strategic Communication and Information Operations in the DoD” of January 25, 2011. 
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MISO is assigned to U.S. Special Operations Command, Cyber and EW are 
assigned to U.S. Strategic Command, and MILDEC and OPSEC are assigned to 
the joint staff. 
As part of the same reorganizational process, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff has reorganized elements of the Joint Information Operations 
Warfare Center (JIOWC), previously assigned to USSTRATCOM. The JIOWC’s 
Joint Electronic Warfare Division remains assigned to USSTRATCOM and the 
remaining elements of the JIOWC were aligned with the Joint Staff. By bringing 
the JIOWC under the supervision of CJCS, it will continue to benefit the COCOMs 
and will remove some of the limitations placed upon it by its subordination to 
STRATCOM.  
The following benefits are anticipated from the above mentioned 
reorganization /assignments: 
1. Creating a single proponent for joint IO integration with 
designated, clear capability proponents. 
2. Improving the U.S.  DoD’s ability to meet combatant command 
requirements and improving development of information-related 
capabilities. 
3. Ensuring operational integration and coherence across combatant 
commands and the interagency. 
Each COCOM has a designated staff (J-3 and its subordinate staff) in the 
command’s headquarter to undertake IO-related duties. Moreover, service 
components and various task forces under COCOM also possess specified IO 
staff. Two of the functional combatant commands (USSTRATCOM and 
USSOCOM) have been entrusted with the responsibility of designated IO 
capabilities, as discussed above. Due to their increased role in the field of IO, 
these commands will be described briefly in ensuing paragraphs. 
D. U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND (USSTRATCOM) 
1. Mission 
USSTRATCOM’s primary responsibility is the stewardship and 
employment of U.S. nuclear weapons and to detect, deter, and prevent attacks 
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against the United States and its allies and to join with the other combatant 
commands to defend the nation should deterrence fail.84 This command 
combines the synergy of the U.S. legacy nuclear command and control mission 
with responsibility for space operations; global strike; DoD information 
operations; global missile defense; and global command, control, 
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(C4ISR), and combating weapons of mass destruction. This dynamic command 
gives national leadership a unified resource for greater understanding of specific 
threats around the world and the means to respond to those threats rapidly.85 
2. History 
USSTRATCOM was established October 1, 2002. The missions most 
directly associated with USSTRATCOM and its predecessors are deterrence and 
global strike. These were the missions of Strategic Air Command (SAC) from 
1946 to 1992 and of the first USSTRATCOM from 1992 to 2002. On June 1, 
1992, SAC was replaced by a new unified command, USSTRATCOM. The new 
command’s primary mission was to deter attack, especially nuclear attack, on the 
United States and its allies and, if deterrence failed, employ nuclear forces in 
response.86  
The U.S. military began operating in space in the late 1950s, with many of 
the early systems developed to meet SAC’s needs for surveillance, warning, 
meteorology, and communications. By 1985, space activities had grown to such 
a scale that U.S. DoD created a new unified command, USSPACECOM, to 
manage military space operations. The U.S. DoD then took initiative to merge 
USSTRATCOM and USSPACECOM, which led to the creation of the current 
USSTRATCOM in 2002. The U.S. military’s reliance on computer networks grew 
                                            
84 Feickert op. cit., 19. 
85 U.S. Strategic Command official website. Accessed October 28, 2012. 
http://www.stratcom.mil/about/ 
86 Feickert op. cit., 19. 
 52
exponentially in the 1980s and 1990s. U.S. national leaders took steps to protect 
defense networks in 1998, creating a Joint Task Force for Computer Network 
Defense and assigning it to USSPACECOM. As computer attacks against DoD 
become more sophisticated and frequent, there were calls to place greater 
emphasis and visibility on cyber operations. Former U.S. Defense Secretary 
Robert Gates favored a new sub-unified command under USSTRATCOM that 
would recombine offensive and defensive computer-network operations. 
Established 21 May 2010, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) was fully 
operational on October 31, 2010.87 
3. Command Subcomponents. 
As mentioned above, the USSTRATCOM consists of a sub-unified 
command, namely U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), besides several joint 
functional and service components. As far as relevance to IO objectives is 
concerned, the role of USCYBERCOM is critical in conducting CNO and IA 
functions. USCYBERCOM centralizes the command of cyberspace operations, 
strengthens U.S. DoD cyberspace capabilities, and integrates and bolsters DoD 
cyber expertise. It consequently improves the U.S. DoD’s capabilities to ensure 
resilient, reliable information and communication networks, counter cyberspace 
threats, and assure access to cyberspace. USCYBERCOM’s efforts also support 
the armed services’ ability to confidently conduct high-tempo, effective operations 
and protect command-and-control systems and the cyberspace infrastructure 
supporting weapons-system platforms from disruptions, intrusions and attacks.88 
A synopsis of USSTRATCOM command subcomponents, including functional 
and service elements, is given in Appendix B.  
                                            
87 Ibid., 20. 
88 This information is retrieved from U.S. Cyber Command Fact Sheet published by U.S. 




E. U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (USSOCOM) 
1. Mission 
USSOCOM’s primary mission is to organize, train, and equip special-
operations forces (SOF) and provide those forces to the geographic combatant 
commanders under whose operational control they serve. USSOCOM also 
develops special-operations strategy, doctrine, and procedures for the use of 
SOF and also develops and procures specialized, SOF-unique equipment for its 
assigned forces. USSOCOM is also the lead COCOM for synchronizing DoD 
planning against terrorists and their networks on a global basis. USSOCOM can 
execute global operations against terrorist networks when directed to do so by 
the president or secretary of defense.89  
2. History 
The 1980 Desert One tragedy90 and the 1983 loss of 237 U.S. Marines in 
Beirut, combined with the command-and-control problems experienced during 
Grenada in 1983, heightened apprehensions about the DoD’s ability to manage 
the services, including special-operations forces who were “owned” by their 
respective services. The U.S. president approved the establishment of 
USSOCOM on April 13, 1987, and the DoD activated this new unified command 
on April 16, 1987.91  
                                            
89 Feickert op. cit., 15. 
90 The disastrous “Desert One” Rescue Operation began in the evening of April 24, 1980, 
when U.S. military forces launched a bold but failed attempt to rescue their fellow American 
citizens and their nation’s honor from captivity in Tehran. In the early hours of April 25, the effort 
ended in fiery disaster with a loss of eight U.S. soldiers at a remote spot in Iran known ever after 
as Desert One. This information is taken from Otto Kreisher article in the Air Force Magazine 
posted on October 13, 2001. Accessed November 4, 2012. http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-
news/547308/posts 
91 Feickert op. cit., 15–16. 
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3. IO Core and Related Capabilities within USSOCOM Purview92. 
a. Military Information Support Operations (MISO) 
A vital part of the broad range of U.S. political, military, economic, 
and information activities used by the U.S. government to secure national 
objectives, MISO disseminates truthful information to foreign audiences in 
support of U.S. policy and national objectives. Used during peacetime, 
contingency operations, and declared war, these activities are not a form of 
force, but are force multipliers that use nonviolent means in often-violent 
environments. Persuading rather than compelling physically, they rely on logic, 
fear, desire or other mental factors to promote specific emotions, attitudes, or 
behaviors. The ultimate objective of U.S. military information support operations 
is to convince target audiences to take action favorable toward the United States 
and its allies. The importance and effectiveness of military information support 
operations has been underscored during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi 
Freedom.  
b. Civil Affairs (CA) 
CA units support military commanders by working to minimize the 
effect of civilians in the battle space and by coordinating with civil authorities and 
civilian populations in the commander’s area of operations to lessen the impact 
of military operations on them during peace, contingency operations, and 
declared war. Civil affairs forces support activities of both conventional and SOF, 
and are capable of assisting and supporting the civil administration in their area 
of operations. Long after the guns have fallen silent, the men and women of civil 
affairs continue to provide assistance to foreign governments and stabilize 
regions in turmoil.  
                                            
92 Information in this section is taken from U.S. Army War College IO Primer, November 
2011,  146. 
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c. Components 
USSOCOM has four component commands from each service 
(Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps) and one sub-unified command. With 
the IO perspective in view, the Army component known as U.S. Army Special 
Operations Command (USASOC) contributes directly in provision of 
psychological operations and civil affairs forces to USSOCOM for deployment as 
required to other unified combatant commands and country ambassadors around 
the world. They also provide logistics and signal support to these operations.93 A 
general description of all USSOCOM components is attached as Appendix C.  
F. IO ORGANIZATION IN THE U.S. ARMED SERVICES 
IO organization in U.S. joint staff and realignment of various IO capabilities 
has been described earlier in the chapter. IO organization at the services level is 
also evolving continuously and undergoing significant changes from time to time. 
These organizations will be briefly covered here. 
1. The U.S. Army  
At the top tier in American hierarchy under the Chief of Staff U.S. Army 
(CSA), designations of G3/G5/G7 represent deputy chiefs of staff for operations. 
At the corps/division level, G3 is associated with operations and plans, G5 with 
civil affairs, and G7 with information operations.  
The USA’s information operations are now evolved into inform and 
influence activities (IIA) and cyber/electromagnetic activities as new mission 
command warfighting functions (WFF) as discussed in Chapter III. Accordingly, 
the final draft of U.S. Army Doctrine FM 3–13 on IIA now designates G7 (S-7 for 
brigade level and lower) as responsible for integration of information-related 
capabilities. Per the doctrine,  
                                            
93 This information is taken from USASOC web page of Global Security.org. Accessed on 
November 18,2012. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/arsoc.htm. 
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The G-7 (S-7), inform and influence activities officer, serves as the 
commander’s primary coordinating staff officer for integrating 
information-related capabilities and assessing measures of 
performance (MOP) and measures of effectiveness (MOE) in 
accordance with the plan. To best advise the commander, the G-7 
(S-7) must understand the information and operational 
environments.94 
The G-7 will not have the responsibility for synchronizing all cyber/EW 
activities but will conduct coordination to ensure these activities support IIA 
activities.95 
2. The U.S. Navy  
The top-level positions of deputy chief of naval operations (DCNO) for 
intelligence (N2) and DCNO for communications (N6) in the Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations (OPNAV) were merged on October 1, 2009. The new 
directorate is headed by a three-star flag officer known as the DCNO for 
information dominance (OPNAV N2/N6). In this plan, manpower and readiness 
resources for the Information Dominance Corps have been consolidated under 
N2/N6 to enable informed program wholeness and warfighting capability trades 
for information, cyber, and electronic warfare systems. Additionally, personnel, 
training and readiness personnel from N1 (manpower and personnel) and N4 
(fleet readiness and logistics) will be transferred to N2/N6 to enable more 
informed system centric trades and warfighting integration. N2/N6 is responsible 
for Integration and Interoperability assessments for all warfare systems.96 
According to ex-CNO of the USN Admiral Roughead remarks,  
…this merger is in support of the establishment of Fleet Cyber 
Command, whose mission will be to serve as the central 
operational authority for networks, intelligence, cryptology/signals 
                                            
94 USA FM 3–13, “Inform and Influence Activities- Final Draft,” Headquarters Department of 
the Army, Washington, DC, 25 October 2011: 4–1. 
95 U.S. Army War College IO Primer, November 2011: 9. 
96 Online article on U.S. Navy website, “CNO realigns OPNAV Staff.” Accessed November 6, 
2012. http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=65845 
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intelligence, information operations, cyber, electronic warfare and 
space in support of forces afloat and ashore. While N2/N6 will focus 
on investments to ensure future dominance, Fleet Cyber Command 
will focus on operations.97  
3. The U.S. Air Force 
At the U.S. air-staff level, A2 is responsible for intelligence, surveillance 
and reconnaissance and A3/5 for operations, plans and requirements.98 The Air 
Combat Command (ACC) and Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) are among 
the thirteen major/component commands of the USAF.99 Both these major 
commands operate IO units to accomplish their assigned duties and assist joint 
forces.  
The U.S. Air Force activated its cyber-focused, numbered air force, the 
24th Air Force, under AFSPC back in 2009. This step was a major milestone in 
the combination of space and cyberspace operations within one command. The 
24 AF provides combat-ready forces trained and equipped to conduct sustained 
cyber operations, fully integrated within air and space operations. It also enables 
combatant commanders with critical cyber component capabilities, ensuring a 
key element of joint and combined operations toward its global mission. The 24 
AF has three major three wings in its organization: the 688th Information 
Operations Wing (IOW), the 67th Network Warfare Wing, and the 689th Combat 
Communications Wing.100 The 688th Information Operations Wing delivers 
proven information operations and engineering infrastructure capabilities 
integrated across air, space and cyberspace domains. The 688th team 
comprises more than 1200 military and civilian members skilled in the areas of 
                                            
97 Online article on N2/N6 Reorganization. Accessed November 6, 2012. 
http://www.dawnbreaker.com/portals/p3p/opnav/opnav-n2-n6.php 
98 Information taken from official USAF website. Accessed November 7, 2012. 
http://www.af.mil/information/afchain/index.asp 
99 Information taken from official USAF website. Accessed November 7, 2012. 
http://www.af.mil/publicwebsites/index.asp 
100 Information taken from official USAF website. Accessed November 7, 2012. 
http://www.afspc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123163863 
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engineering installation, weaponeering, operations research, intelligence, 
communications and computer applications. The wing is further composed of two 
groups: the 318th Information Operations Group (IOG) and the 38th Cyberspace 
Engineering Group (CEG).101  
4. The U.S. Marine Corps102   
At the USMC staff level, the G-3/S-3 is responsible for IO. The future 
operations (FuOps) section, in conjunction with the Marine Air-Ground Task 
Force (MAGTF) fires and effects cell is responsible for overseeing the planning 
and coordination of the IO effort. MAGTF is the basic framework for deployable 
Marine units and carries a flexible structure that can vary in size per the 
requirements of the mission. The MAGTF IO officer, within G-3/S-3 FuOps, is 
mainly responsible for: 
 The broad integration and synchronization of IO efforts.  
 Responding directly to the G-3/S-3 for MAGTF IO. 
 Participating, as a member, in the operational planning team (OPT) 
during all phases of planning to ensure coordinated operations. 
 Preparing the IO appendix to the operation order (OPORD). 
 Directing the efforts of core IO cell personnel as well as liaisons 
from external agencies. 
 Coordinating and supporting IO activities of subordinate 
commands. 
Established within a MAGTF and/or higher headquarters, the IO cell is a 
task-organized group that integrates information-related capabilities. A fully 
functioning IO cell plans for, monitors the execution of, and assesses the effects 
of IO across all MAGTF operations. The cell accomplishes this through extensive 
planning and coordination among all elements of the staff. The size, structure, 
and placement of the IO cell within the staff are tailored to meet the mission and 
                                            
101 Information taken from official USAF website. Accessed November 7, 2012. 
http://www.24af.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=15333 
102 U.S. Army War College IO Primer, November 2011: 80–81. 
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commander’s intent. Integration of intelligence into the information operations cell 
is critical to the planning, execution, and assessment of IO. In order to effectively 
engage the intelligence system, the IO staff clearly articulates intelligence 
requirements in order to facilitate G-2/S-2 staff to effectively work toward 
successful IO planning and execution. 
G. SUMMARY 
Information operations are part of all major joint, service level, functional 
and geographical military organizations of the United States. The details covered 
in this chapter show only a glimpse of the enormous information-related activities 
conducted in the U.S. DoD and its constituent organizations. In order to remain 
abreast with latest trends of warfare and innovating technologies, IO forces and 
their structures have been changing continuously, particularly in the last decade 
or so. The expansion in these organizations and the development of new 
operational units also testify that the sphere of IO activities is consistently on the 
rise, both in areas where conflict or war exist and where peace is prevalent. It is 
also evident from the study that IO organization and its synchronization and 
coordination with other activities has received significant focus and emphasis 
from top leadership, because only a viable organizational plan and effective 
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V. ESTABLISHING A VIABLE INFORMATION WARFARE 
CAPABILITY IN SMALLER MILITARIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Preparation for information warfare and the conducting of all phases of 
information operations at a national level requires an overarching policy, an 
implementing strategy developed by responsible organizations, and the 
operational doctrine and personnel to carry out the policy.103 In the preceding 
chapter, the general contours of an IO organization in a well-established military 
structure, such as the U.S. armed forces, were presented. In smaller militaries, 
the structure of IO organization is usually much more limited in scope, either due 
to less IO-intensive strategic objectives, or financial constraints resulting from 
national economic conditions, or both. Identifying relevant and effective 
capabilities of IO that best suit the accomplishment of national-security interests 
is the primary requirement toward a comprehensive and all-encompassing IO 
policy of any nation. As a first step toward this goal, there should be a clear 
procedural understanding of policy and strategic level IW issues by the decision-
making hierarchy of a country, to support the production of intellectual 
documentation.  
B. INFORMATION WARFARE POLICY AND STRATEGY104 
1. General 
The various capabilities that are grouped under the realm of information 
warfare are the means at the bottom of a classical hierarchy that leads from the 
ends (objectives) of national-security policy. The hierarchy proceeds from the 
policy to an implementing strategy, then to operational doctrine (procedures) and 
                                            
103 Edward Waltz, Information Warfare Principles and Operations (Norwood: Artech House, 
1998), 139. 
104 Information in this section is taken by abridging and modifying details from Waltz, 
Information Warfare, 140–144. 
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a structure (organization) that applies at the final tactical level or the technical 
operations of IW. The hierarchy flows down from the security policy, with each 
successive layer in the hierarchy implementing the security objectives of the 
policy. 
Table 3 illustrates this hierarchy with examples of typical representative 
documents that occur at each layer that help to achieve the ultimate goal of 
national security through IW. Although the table lists only military strategic, 
operational, and tactical documents, a comprehensive policy implementation 
must incorporate levels in all areas of the national infrastructure. 
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Define the objects of 
security (interests), the 
security objectives for 
those interests, 
and their intent and 
willingness to apply 
resources to protect those 
interests. 
 
National security policy, 
National Security Act, 
National cryptologic policy, 
National information 
warfare policy, etc. 
 




Develop a plan to apply 
political, economic, 
psychological, and 
military force as 
necessary during peace 
and war to afford the 
maximum support to 
policies. 
 
National security strategy, 
national military strategy, 
joint information warfare 





plan resources; develop 
and test capabilities (e.g., 
human competencies 
legal, technical means); 
create concept of 
operations (CONOPS) to 
implement the strategy. 
Oversee development of 
doctrine. 
 
Service doctrines for 
operations security, military 
deception, psychological 
operations, ew etc. 





Equip, train for, and 
deploy the technical 
means and tactical 
doctrine for application of 
those means to conduct 
IO. 
Fleet/ field tactical manuals 
for specific IW capabilities,  
Training manuals,  
Standing instructions from 
operational commanders, 
etc. 
Table 3.   General Hierarchy of Policy, Strategy, and Operations to Address IW’s 
Military Perspective 
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2. Security Policy  
Policy is the authoritative articulation of the position of an organization, 
defining its interests (the objects being secured), the security objectives for those 
interests, and its intent and willingness to apply resources to protect those 
interests. The interests to be secured and the means of security are defined by 
the policy. The policy may be publicly declared or privately held, and the written 
format must be concise and clear to permit the implementing strategy to be 
traceable to the policy.105 
A security policy to harness the true potential of IW must assess the new 
vulnerabilities of a nation. Information threats go far beyond the traditional 
considerations of geographical limits and political settings. Therefore, the old 
security apparatus that safeguarded geographic and political positions must be 
assessed and renewed.  
Identification of a national information infrastructure (NII) must be clearly 
made in the information-security policy. This infrastructure is very diverse in 
nature and contains military, other government agencies, and private 
stakeholders. The information, processes and structures are all vulnerable, thus 
their pertaining security responsibilities must be clearly defined in the policy to 
identify the object being protected.  
The desired levels of information security that comes under information 
assurance (IA) must be well defined in the policy in terms of integrity, 
authenticity, confidentiality, nonrepudiation, and availability. Moreover, a nation 
must define its intent to use IO and its willingness to apply those weapons. This 
factor becomes highly important when deciding about what actions against the 
nation will constitute sufficient justification to launch information strikes and what 
levels of direct and collateral damage resulting from information strikes are 
permissible.  
                                            
105 Waltz, Information Warfare, 140. 
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A general representation of various functional tiers involved in the 
formulation of policy documents down to operations level tasks is illustrated in 
Figure 11. It can also be noted in the diagram that certain technical operations 
are related to each other and detailed coordination is required for their proper 
execution. Moreover, operations at the lowest tier of the tactical level contribute 
ultimately to the implementation of the stated policy.  
 
 
Figure 11.  Fundamental hierarchy and components of a national information-security 
strategy106 
                                            
106 Waltz op. cit.: 145. 
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3. Security Strategy  
National strategy107 is the art and science of developing and using the 
political, economic, and informational powers of a nation, together with its armed 
forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives. The national military 
strategy, normally approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in most 
countries, extends this to apply the armed forces to afford the maximum support 
to policies in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of 
victory and to lessen the chances of defeat. Strategists, in both military and 
business alike, debate the precise content, development, and implementation of 
strategy, but all recognize it must be a dynamic process, ever changing to adapt 
to the external environment to meet even a static policy position.108 
Strategy is articulated in a plan, defining the means to implement policy. 
The strategic process (Figure 12) includes both strategy developing activities and 
a complementary assessment process that continuously monitors the 
effectiveness of the strategy. 
                                            
107 Strategy, per JP 1–02, is a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of 
national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or 
multinational objectives. 




Figure 12.  The strategic process includes strategy development and assessment 
elements.109 
It is evident from the above figure that threats drive the formulation of 
objectives in strategy development. An accurate and correct assessment of all 
threats to the national information infrastructure is vital in this regard. The 
strategic objectives so formed are always in concordance with the national 
security policy. After development of the strategic plan, possible risks in strategy 
implementations are weighed and their consequences are considered. 
                                            
109 Waltz, Information Warfare, 146. 
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Consequently, operational requirements for organizations’ structures, their 
associated research and development (R&D), and test and evaluation (T&E) 
requirements are determined for an overall budget allocation. Due consideration 
should be given to development of operational concepts, doctrines, and training. 
Throughout this process, effective monitoring of the performance of all activities 
ensures timely completion and implementation of the plan.  
C. FEASIBLE IW ADAPTATION FOR SMALLER MILITARIES 
There are a small number of fundamental war principles that we 
cannot ignore without risk, and where, on the contrary, the 
application has always been successful. 
Henri, Baron de Jomini (Précis de l’art de la guerre 1838;  
Summary of the Art of War, 1868).110 
As was discussed in an earlier chapter, EW and CNO are comparatively 
new core capabilities added to IO’s arsenal, whereas the rest of the core 
capabilities have been used in warfare since early ages. Similarly, when looking 
at the rest of the supporting and related capabilities, only IA and COMCAM are 
the products of recent technological advancements. The rest of the capabilities 
are based on older recognized warfighting principles. By their very nature, the 
capabilities of EW, CNO, and IA (when seen in the context of cyber related 
measures and activities) are technologically dependent and resource intensive. 
In smaller militaries, these capabilities can be difficult to introduce at their full 
capacity or to manage at maximum efficacy. However, a careful selection and 
implementation of various older and relatively inexpensive capabilities, from 
policies to strategic planning and operations, can prove to be extremely helpful in 
eradicating the common menaces of insurgencies and terrorism in an irregular 
and asymmetric environment. In the past, many IW theorists and practitioners 
have advocated attacking perceptional and physical levels of an information 
environment as complementary to conventional military warfare. Arguing for this 
stance, Major Yulin Whitehead, USAF, noted following in his paper, 
                                            
110 Daniel Ventre, Information Warfare, (London: ISTE Ltd, 2009), 114. 
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It is clear that while information may be used as a weapon, 
strategists must use it with caution and common sense. It is not a 
silver-bullet weapon. Rather, the strategist should plan the use of 
the information weapon in conjunction with more traditional 
weapons and employ it as a precursor weapon to blind the enemy 
prior to conventional attacks and operations.111 
Before proceeding to the discussion of feasible IW capabilities in the 
perspective of developing countries, it is important to take a look at the 
predominant threat faced by militaries in these countries. 
1. Insurgencies and Terrorist Activities in Developing Countries.  
From the study of insurgencies in the post–19th-century era, it is apparent 
that all insurgencies and uprisings have erupted in developing countries or 
regions in more prosperous nations that suffer from less development. Major 
instances include the Philippines (1902–1913), Malayan insurgency (1948–
1989), Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962), Angola (1961–2002), 
Eritrean War of Independence (1961–1991), Vietnam (1955–1975), Iraq (2003–
2008), Sri Lanka (1983–2009), and Afghanistan (2003–present).112  
According to Global Terrorism Database (GTD)113 empirical data from 
1971 until 2007, developing countries are by far the most severely affected by 
terrorist attacks. Figure 13 below represents these data graphically and lists the 
                                            
111 Yulin Whitehead, Information as a Weapon: Reality versus Promises, Airpower Journal 
Fall 1997:50. Accessed November 15, 2012. ics-www.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/ 
548/whitehead.pdf 
112 Rodney Graves, A short course in the history of insurgency and counter-insurgency, 
online resource. Accessed November 15, 2012. http://wizbangblog.com/content/2011/06/01/a-
very-short-course-in-the-history-of-insurgency-and-counter-insurgency.php 
113 The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is an open-source database including information 
on terrorist events around the world from 1970 through 2011. Its copyrights are under ‘The 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism’ (START), which is a 
Center of Excellence of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, University of Maryland, 
College Park, MD, USA. START makes the GTD available online through interface 
(http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/) in an effort to increase understanding of terrorist violence so that 
it can be more readily studied and defeated. 
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total number of incidents by nation. These data show that the major threat for 







Figure 13.  Temporal trends in terrorism in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)114. 
 
                                            
114 Global Terrorism Database (GTD) website. Accessed November 14, 2012. 
http://www.start.umd.edu/datarivers/vis/GtdExplorer.swf 
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2. The IW Capabilities with the Greatest Benefit for Smaller 
Militaries  
From the preceding discussion, it is evident that the most critical security 
challenge to developing countries, in general, is the ability to root out 
insurgencies and terrorist activities. Certain IO capabilities, as delineated in U.S. 
Joint Publication 3–13, like CMO/CA, public diplomacy, PA, PSYOP, MILDEC, 
and physical attack provide policymakers in such developing countries an 
effective and viable way of conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) and 
counterterrorism operations. It is also important to note here that the above-
stated capabilities are feasible when considered in the context of using them 
against an unconventional enemy in an unconventional battlefield. In 
conventional warfare, employing capabilities such as MILDEC against regular 
forces will require the latest technological innovations, considerable troops, and 
financial resources. However, deception when used against insurgents and 
terrorists will be different and less complex in nature and design. Following this 
same premise, IW capabilities like EW, CNO and IA typically cannot produce 
significant direct impacts on the enemy in an asymmetrical environment. 
Similarly, the enemy in this case is also not typically targeting computer networks 
and associated infrastructure, because of a relatively limited reliance upon these 
systems by organizations in developing countries. The primary focus of enemy 
activities continues to be finding sympathetic local populations and geographical 
safe havens. The more traditional capabilities of CMO/CA, PA, PSYOP, and 
MILDEC provide an effective means of controlling the cognitive dimension of the 
information environment. The ability derived from selected IW capabilities to 
manage the perceptions of all groups and parties involved in the conflict can 
significantly contribute to achieving the desired end state.  
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3. Shaping Perceptions with the Help of IW115 
As mentioned above, these four capabilities of IO provide the means to 
monitor and manage the perception of target audiences to meet overall 
operations objectives. This aim should be kept at the top level and subsequent 
activity should be regarded as the most important activity of an IO strategy. The 
highest-level target of IO is the human perception of decision makers, 
policymakers, military commanders, and even entire populations. The capabilities 
shown in Figure 14 directly hit these ultimate targets with an objective to 
influence their perception to affect their decisions and resulting activities. 
 
                                            
115 Information in this section is taken by abridging and modifying details from Waltz, 




Figure 14.  Capabilities Involved in Shaping Perception.116 
Public and civil-affairs operations (including civil–military operations) are 
open, public presentations of the truth (not misinformation or propaganda) in a 
context and format that achieves perception objectives defined in a perception 
plan. These are the best tools to counter enemy propaganda (terrorist and 
insurgent survival rests in the local population’s defection from the government). 
                                            
116 Waltz, Information Warfare, 163. 
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PSYOP also convey only selected truthful messages, as described in its 
definition covered in Chapter III, to foreign audiences (including hostile forces) to 
influence both the emotions and reasoning of decision makers. Selected themes 
and emphasis are chosen often in the process along with selected indicators to 
meet objectives. PSYOP require careful tailoring of the message (to be culturally 
appropriate) and selection of the media (to ensure that the message is received 
by the target population). The most appropriate media (method of delivery of the 
message) in developing countries comes in the forms of direct broadcast 
television and radio, posters/leaflets, loudspeakers, and telephone 
conversations. Certain government/military actions, such as preparations for 
military offensive, also contribute toward PSYOP. Developing of appropriate 
message themes should be done in consultation with those members of 
civil/military organizations belonging to the same tribe or ethnicity in order to 
create the desired perception in the target population. PSYOP efforts should also 
be directed in places bordering insurgent-infested areas so as to prevent the rest 
of the population residing in adjoining locations from joining or supporting rebels 
and winning their support for government actions/military operations. A general 





Figure 15.  Functional Flow of a PSYOP Campaign.117 
In contrast to the first three means, military deception operations are 
performed in secrecy (assisted by operational, physical, and communications 
security) with the objective of conveying untruthful or inaccurate information to 
deceive the enemy. These operations are designed to induce hostile leaders to 
take operational or tactical actions that are favorable to, and exploitable by, 
friendly combat operations. It is pertinent here that deception contributes to the 
achievement of a perception objective; it is generally not an end objective in 
itself. In the case of low-intensity conflict or irregular warfare, planning and 
execution of deception by a regular military force should be relatively less 
complicated, inexpensive, and more swiftly executable. In the cases of both 
PSYOP and MILDEC, intelligence must provide feedback on the degree of 
efficacy of these efforts in order to introduce timely corrections as necessary.  
 
                                            
117 Waltz, Information Warfare, 211. 
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In addition to the above-mentioned four capabilities that operate mainly in 
the cognitive dimension, physical attack is an IO-related capability that provides a 
means in the physical dimension to affect the perceptual level of the enemy and 
the content and flow of information. The physical components of the information 
infrastructure (and supporting functions, such as electrical power, air 
conditioning, and human operators) may be subject to physical attacks to disable 
(soft kill) or destroy (hard kill) the targeted components. Operational formations 
and units (e.g., special-operations forces, conventional forces, and attack-aircraft 
wings of an air force) are assigned physical destruction tasks against the critical 
command and control nodes of enemy forces. In the battle against insurgency 
and terrorism, this mode affords execution of the classical maneuver and 
firepower of the military in support of the information-operations objectives. 
Intelligence and surveillance resources are required to accurately pinpoint 
specific locations serving as nerve centers of the enemy communication 
infrastructure, allowing the use of conventional military means to neutralize these 
targets expeditiously through surgical strikes. It is pertinent here that these 
kinetic forces, due to their nature, disposition, and psychological effect, also 
coordinate with PSYOP and deception operations in synchronization with plans 
contrived at higher operational levels.  
4. A Simplistic Operational Model of Information Warfare118 
On the basis of the above discussion, a simplistic operational model of IW 
can be formed that has general applicability in a developing-country scenario. 
Consistent with the information-environment discussion covered in Chapter III, 
where three separate and distinct dimensions (i.e., physical, informational, and 
cognitive) exist, this model is also based on a corresponding three target areas of 
IO: physical space, cyberspace, and the minds of humans. The operational 
model (as represented in Figure 16, below) distinguishes three levels or layers of 
functions for both the attacker and the target. The layers are hierarchical, with 
                                            
118 The model is built upon the concept taken from Waltz, Information Warfare, 148–151.  
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influence flowing downward on the attack side and upward on the target side. 
The objective of the attacker is to influence the target at the perceptual level by 
actions that may occur at all levels of the hierarchy. For the purpose of this 
model, the middle (information-structure level) or cyberspace layer will be 
considered dysfunctional both from attacker and target perspective for the 
reasons explained earlier in the discussion. CNO against asymmetric forces will 
not yield any significant outcome in absence of any formal, fully functional 
information infrastructure in cyberspace and due to a reduced reliance on 
computer networks. Stringent actions at the perceptual and physical levels can 
produce much more effective and favorable results for smaller militaries required 




Figure 16.  A Simplistic Model for IO in Developing Countries119 
The first layer is at the perceptual or psychological level, which is abstract 
in nature and aimed at management of the perception of a target audience. At 
this level, the strategic objective defines the desired actions of the target and the 
perception(s) that will most likely cause those actions. If the desired action is 
termination of aggression, for example, the objective perception for targeted 
leaders may be “overwhelming loss of control, disarray, and loss of support from 
the populace.” If the desired action is disengagement from a military action, the 
objective perception for targeted military commanders may be “lack of logistic 
support to sustain operations.” These perception objectives may be achieved 
                                            
119 Waltz, Information Warfare, 149. 
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through integrated and synchronized employment of a variety of IW capabilities 
such as physical attack, deception, PSYOP, and PA/CA, as determined earlier. 
The synergy derived from the timely application of IW capabilities can help 
influence the operational behavior of the target. This influence can then cause 
indecision, delay, or decisional bias.  
The third and lowest layer is the physical system level, which includes the 
computers, physical networks, telecommunications, and supporting structural 
components (e.g., power, facilities, and environmental controls) that implement 
the information system. Attacks at this layer are physical in nature and involve 
conventional military forces and weapons. As noted earlier, a smaller military 
force must be able to proficiently destroy physical targets in order to not only 
disrupt the information flow in the targeted organization, but also to produce 
subtle psychological effects. For instance, persistent precision air strikes on the 
logistics-carrying vehicles of the adversary through effective intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), besides having effects on physical level 
through disruption of their supply lines, will also produce favorable results at the 
perceptual level. The inability to protect and secure supply routes over a period 
of time may then influence the enemy leadership to capitulate.  
D. SUMMARY 
The development of an effective and viable IW capability starts from the 
top level of national-policy formulation. A comprehensive understanding of the 
various functional tiers, starting from policy to planning strategies and setting 
objectives, is mandatory for the political and military leadership at the helm of 
decision making. Assessment of threats and the operational environment plays a 
critical role in the development of the strategic plan under the guidelines provided 
by national security policy. Based on the empirical data, the most prevalent 
security challenge faced by smaller militaries in developing countries stems from 
insurgencies and terrorism. In the resulting scenario, militaries are engaged with 
an unconventional enemy that avoids direct military confrontation and finds 
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strength in molding and distorting the perceptions of the local populace. Certain 
traditional military capabilities and activities, coordinated and integrated under 
the realm of IW, provide a suitable course of action to root out insurrections and 
terrorism. In this approach, PSYOP, MILDEC, CMO, and PA can provide a 
means of influence at the perceptual level of the information environment and 
can seriously degrade or paralyze the decision making of the enemy and affect 
behavior. On the physical level of the information environment, physical attack 
provides leverage to military forces to unleash devastating blows that carry far-
reaching effects upon the cognitive dimension of the enemy. Prudent planning 
and coordinated execution of these IW capabilities can make the difference in 
winning or losing irregular wars.  
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VI. SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY 
Information warfare is a reality of the 21st century. While the military is 
focused equally on all dimensions of the information environment—
cognitive/perceptual, informational, and physical—non-state-sponsored and 
business organizations are more inclined to fight a war for information superiority 
in only the cognitive or perceptual level to achieve their commercial and 
corporate goals. Information warfare in the context of the military application 
requires teamwork; it can be seen metaphorically as a handcart with a heavy 
load. A combined effort from many individuals in a common direction is usually 
required to pull a heavy cart forward. The required strength of individuals 
increases as the load gets heavier. In the case of IW, individuals are the various 
capabilities that must have the synergy and synchronization to produce the 
desired pulling effect. The peculiar nature of geographical and demographic 
settings in a country or theater determines the required combination of 
capabilities and the level of coordination among these like, just as a heavy load 
on a handcart would require only fit and physically strong individuals to do the 
arduous pulling.  
The study of IW’s classification as implemented by the U.S. DoD provides 
an all-encompassing view of IW capabilities. U.S. IO execution strategy takes 
into account all possible information avenues that can contribute effectively to 
achieving mission objectives in general and IO objectives in particular. This line 
of approach is supported by recent combat experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
where various IO-related theories have been practically tested in the ruggedness 
of the battlefield. Similarly, examining the IO organizational structures of the U.S. 
joint staff and services renders a valuable insight for developing a suitable model 
in other smaller regional militaries, per the dictates of security challenges.  
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One of the noticeable differences in the societies of developed and 
developing countries is the dependence upon information technology in day-to-
day affairs. Since most of the commercial, governmental, and military institutions 
and organizations in developing countries are relatively less reliant on IT and 
computer networks, they are relatively less vulnerable on this front. Therefore, 
many of the latest and more technological IO capabilities may make less of a 
contribution in these countries when seen in the context of fighting against an 
insurgency or terrorism, their biggest security challenge. On the other hand, an 
increased focus and coordination on some traditional IW capabilities can bring 
about extremely favorable results for their efforts. The perceptual and physical 
dimensions are more apparent and relevant in counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism campaigns, and should be exploited prudently. PSYOP and 
MILDEC (from the core capabilities) along with CMO, public affairs, and public 
diplomacy (from related capabilities) can be extremely helpful in achieving 
objectives at the cognitive and perceptual levels. On the physical and kinetic side 
of operations, physical attack (from supporting capabilities) can be utilized to 
destroy, disrupt, degrade, and/or deny the physical infrastructure of the enemy. 
Putting together these capabilities in a cohesive, tenacious, and synchronized 
manner under the auspices of well thought-out IW strategy presents the best 
possible and most cost-effective solution for smaller militaries to tackle their 
biggest security threat. Depending on appreciation of the situation by the 
decision maker, a comprehensive strategy must articulate the relative priority 
among the use of capabilities and their extent of application. This will help sub-
ordinate commanders to ascertain appropriate scale of the capabilities and place 
due emphasis in their application, when needed.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A general survey of IO capabilities was undertaken in this study with an 
aim to identifying feasible capabilities that can prove beneficial to the smaller 
militaries of developing countries. Though the capabilities identified in this 
process were not examined down to the operational and functional level with 
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regard to implementation methodology, the understanding obtained hitherto 
leads to the following recommendations: 
1. Policy Formulation by Government and Military leaders 
Government and military leaders should focus on developing policies and 
strategies for conducting and regulating information warfare. In absence of a 
basic framework provided by such documents, the decision makers normally 
resort to employ overwhelming conventional force to crush insurgents and 
terrorists. This practice may yield some success at tactical levels but remains 
largely ineffective in the long run. Moreover, this heavy-handed tactic also 
produces heavy collateral damage, thereby alienating local populations, which 
goes against the objective of counterinsurgency. Employing a combination of 
non-kinetic IW capabilities in unison with conventional maneuver, as identified in 
the IW strategy, provides the best course of action in such scenarios.  
2. Making Comprehensive IW strategy  
A comprehensive IW strategy should involve representations from political 
leadership (both national and local), civil administration, and the military. Any 
activity performed without including any of these segments will not address the 
root causes of instability or conflict. The ambit of civil–military operations suffers 
serious limitations when a vacuum of civil order exists in the affected area and all 
powers are exercised by military forces. The CMO and PA staffs should be fully 
conversant in broader IO plans and objectives. They should try to improve public 
perceptions in their favor, especially among the masses of their immediate 
locale, starting with the early stages of a conflict. As a guiding principle, the 
military should endeavor to contact, not control, the local population. 
3. Managing the Perceptual Level through IW 
At the perceptual level, it is typically easier for enemy forces to arouse 
public sentiments against a military presence in an area. PSYOP, CMO, and 
civil-affairs team should provide full support to legitimate local government 
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authorities and assist in their functions without interfering with their governance. 
Any effort by the insurgents and terrorists to challenge the writ of local 
government must be quelled through the cumulative effect of identified IW 
capabilities. Due to their very nature, military forces lack permanence in their 
area of operations. An early restoration of civil order provides a serious blow to 
enemy agendas and paves the path toward success.  
4. Systematic Development of IW Capabilities 
IW capabilities, if properly furthered and developed through regular 
training and career progression, can transform a military force into a hybrid force. 
It can then undertake counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations 
efficiently besides regular conventional military operations while maintaining a 
much-desired conventional-military posture. Adequate funding, resources, and 
staff must be allocated to PSYOP, CMO, and PA teams to train and equip 
properly before any deployment. 
5. Organizing CMO, PSYOP and PA 
CMO, PSYOP and PA teams should maintain continuous liaison with print 
and electronic media. Their messages and themes should undergo the shortest 
possible approval process because a late product loses its effectiveness and 
relevance. Another important point in this regard is performing an advanced 
planning of PSYOP and PA activities and their continuous updating as 
diplomatic, political, and military circumstances change frequently during a 
campaign or conflict. Their charter of duties and action plan for rebuilding and 
rehabilitation during the post conflict period should be fully worked out at the 
operational planning level. Any laxity in effort at this stage can severely 
undermine public support for both the government and the military.  
6. Cooperation and Coordination  
The importance of cooperation and coordination among various IW 
capabilities and agencies entrusted with the execution of those capabilities needs 
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no further emphasis. A sound strategy and a well-orchestrated plan can be in 
vain due to a lack of synchronization and timing. All possible channels to share 
information between various agencies, stakeholders, and IW teams must be 
established and tested before the commencement of operations. It must be noted 
here that often the desired outcome of an IW effort is a cumulative product, not 
just the sum of various information operations, where a single null can bring the 
entire product to zero.  
C. CONCLUSION 
The instruments of battle are valuable only if one knows how 
to use them. 
Colonel Charles Ardant du Picq,  
French Army120 
There are no ready-made solutions for the security challenges of a 
country. Instead of finding a silver bullet, the correct approach to address 
national-security issues starts from identifying one’s own strengths and 
vulnerabilities in a realistic and unbiased manner. Based on these findings and 
analysis, formulation of the appropriate policy and strategy can ultimately lead to 
effective planning at the operational level. Unfortunately, in many developing 
countries, due attention is not rendered toward formulation of policies, strategies, 
and doctrines, which results in a void of directivity at the executional level. The 
situation is not different either when it comes to harnessing potentials on the 
informational front. The U.S. information-operations model provides suitable 
guidelines for exploiting the powers of information. It is up to national policy and 
decision makers to treat information as an instrument of national power on 
diplomatic, economic, and military lines, or consider it in a support function for 
other national elements. The later approach will limit the information scope as a 
leveraging force required in the success of campaigns, battles, and conflicts. 
From U.S. doctrine, it is apparent that certain traditional military disciplines, 
                                            
120 Charles Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle, 8th ed. (French), 
trans. John Greely and Robert C. Cotton (New York: Macmillan, 1920). 
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upgraded and modified for modern-day use, provide an effective means to 
manipulate enemy perceptions at tactical, operational, and strategic levels, thus 
undermining greatly the enemy’s capacity to wage and sustain war. IO 
capabilities of PSYOP, CMO, PA, and MILDEC, if properly developed and 
employed, can be extremely useful at the perceptual level of the information 
environment. These capabilities, coupled with timely targeting of carefully 
selected communication hubs and infrastructure through physical attack, can 










APPENDIX A. U.S. UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN (UCP) AND 
COMBATANT COMMANDS (COCOMS) 
The Unified Command Plan (UCP) and associated combatant commands 
(COCOMs) provide operational instructions and command and control to the 
armed forces and have a significant impact on how they are organized, trained, 
and resourced—areas over which Congress has constitutional authority. In a 
grand strategic sense, the UCP and the COCOMs are the embodiment of U.S. 
military policy both at home and abroad. The COCOMs not only execute military 
policy but also play an important role in foreign policy.121  
A. COMBATANT COMMAND (COCOM) 
DoD defines combatant command (COCOM) as “a unified122 or 
specified123 command with a broad continuing mission under a single 
commander established and so designated by the president, through the 
secretary of defense and with the advice and assistance of the chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or 
functional responsibilities.124 
Commands are in charge of utilizing and integrating air, land, sea, and 
amphibious forces under their commands to achieve U.S. national security 
objectives while protecting national interests. Three of the unified commands 
                                            
121 Andrew Feickert, “The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background 
and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report, July 17, 2012: 1. 
122 Joint Publication 1–02 defines a unified command as a “command with a broad 
continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components 
of two or more Military Departments that is established and so designated by the President, 
through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff.” 
123 Joint Publication 1–02 defines a specified command as “a command that has a broad, 
continuing mission, normally functional, and is established and so designated by the President 
through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. It normally is composed of forces from a single Military Department.” 
124 Ibid., 52.  
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handle functional concerns while there are six with geographic mandates. The 
specific configurations have shifted over the decades, but the idea that 
geography provides an organizing principle remains the same, allowing each 
combatant command to have its specific threats and opportunities. The 
combatant commanders work with the military forces in their theaters, and report 
to the commander in chief and secretary of defense. The combatant 
commanders do not serve on the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor are they the senior 
U.S. representatives in the theater.125 The number of combatant commands is 
not regulated by law or policy and their numbers and responsibilities have varied 
over the years. Today, there are nine active COCOMs, with one COCOM, U.S. 
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), disestablished in August 2010 and all of its 
remaining functions transferred to other COCOMs or organizations.126 
The nine COCOMs are briefly discussed here:127 
1. Functional Combatant Commands 
Functional combatant commands operate worldwide across geographical 
boundaries and provide unique capabilities to geographic combatant commands 
and the services: 
 USSOCOM: U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force 
Base, Florida; 
 USSTRATCOM: U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, 
near Omaha, Nebraska; and 
 USTRANSCOM: U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force 
Base, Illinois. 
                                            
125 Cynthia A. Watson, “Combatant Commands: Origins, Structure, and Engagement,” 
Praeger Security International, 2011: 15. 
126 Feickert op. cit., 2. 
127 Ibid.  
 91
2. Geographic Combatant Commands  
Geographical combatant commands operate in clearly delineated areas of 
operation and have a distinctive regional military focus. 
 USAFRICOM: U.S. Africa Command, Kelley Barracks, Stuttgart, 
Germany; 
 USCENTCOM: U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, 
Florida; 
 USEUCOM: U.S. European Command, Patch Barracks, Stuttgart, 
Germany; 
 USNORTHCOM: U.S. Northern Command, Peterson Air Force 
Base, Colorado; 
 USPACOM: U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii; and 
 USSOUTHCOM: U.S. Southern Command, Miami, Florida. 
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Figure 17.  U.S. COCOMS Area of Responsibility in 2011128. 
3. Command Authority 
The structure of command authority should be of particular interest as 
democratic representatives of the United States exercise direct control over 
strategic and operational military commands. Forces assigned to COCOMs are 
under the command of that COCOM commander, with the chain of command 
starting with the President and running through the Secretary of Defense 
(SecDef) as indicated in Figure 3. The CJCS serves as a link between the 
President and the SecDef and the COCOM commanders. The President can 
send guidance to COCOM commanders through the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and the Chairman can relay combatant commander’s 
needs and concerns to the SecDef and the President. The CJCS may exercise 
                                            
128 U.S. Department of Defense website. Accessed October 26, 2012. 
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2009/0109_unifiedcommand/ 
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oversight of the COCOMs, if desired by the SecDef, but has no command 
authority over the COCOMs. In this regard, the CJCS is described as taking part 
in national security discussions but not in the formal decision-making process as 
it relates to COCOMs.129 
  
                                            
129 Feickert op. cit., 11. 
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Note: USJFCOM was disestablished in August 2010 and no longer functions as a 
COCOM. 
Figure 18.  U.S. COCOMS Chain of Command130 
4. Organizational Principles131  
COCOM commanders hold four-star flag rank and have risen through the 
ranks of their respective services, commanding at the highest levels. COCOM 
commanders have also met joint military education requirements as set forth in 
the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The President nominates combatant commanders 
based on the recommendations of the SECDEF. The Senate Armed Services 
Committee holds confirmation hearings for the nominees and the Senate then 
votes to confirm the candidates. While four-star officers from any service may 
serve as combatant commander for any given COCOM, some appointments 
(e.g., U.S. Pacific Command being commanded by a Navy admiral) traditionally 
                                            
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid., 13–14. 
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have gone to specific services. The basic configurations of COCOM staffs are 
generally the same and mirror the Joint Staff at the Pentagon. COCOM staffs are 
organized as follows, although there are variations based on unique COCOM 
mission areas: 
 J-1 Directorate of Manpower and Personnel; 
 J-2 Directorate of Intelligence; 
 J-3 Directorate of Operations; 
 J-4 Directorate of Logistics; 
 J-5 Directorate of Strategic Plans and Policy; 
 J-6 Directorate of Command, Control, Communication, and 
Computer; 
 J-7 Directorate of Operational Planning and Joint Force 
Development; 
 J-8 Directorate of Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment; 
and 
 J-9 Directorate of Interagency Partnering. 
 
Within the COCOM command and staff construct, joint task forces (JTFs) 
are often created to address a single policy concern and allocate resources, such 
as anti-drug efforts or humanitarian assistance, on a short to midterm basis. JTFs 
can also be established in response to a crisis or for a long-term commitment. 
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APPENDIX B. U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND’S 
SUBCOMPONENTS 
A. FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS132 
1. U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) 
USCYBERCOM, under the command of a four-star flag officer, is 
subordinate to USSTRATCOM. It plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes, 
and conducts activities to defend U.S. DoD information networks and also 
conducts cyber space activities to enable U.S. military activities. Organization of 
USCYBERCOM includes following service elements 
 USA—Army Cyber Command (ARFORCYBER/2nd Army)  
 USAF—Air Force Cyber Command (AFCYBER/24th AF) 
 USN—Fleet Cyber Command (FLTCYBERCOM/10th Fleet) 
 USMC—Marine Forces Cyber Command (MARFORCYBER) 
2. Joint Functional Component Command—Global Strike (JFCC-
GS)  
JFCC-GS optimizes planning, integration, execution and force 
management of assigned missions to deter attacks against the United States, its 
territories, possessions, and bases. 
3. Joint Functional Component Command—Space (JFCC-Space) 
JFCC-Space is responsible for executing continuous, integrated space 
operations to deliver theater and global effects in support of national and 
combatant commander objectives. 
                                            
132 Information in this section is taken from 132 Feickert op. cit., 21–22 and USSTRATCOM 
official website. Accessed November 3, 2012. http://www.stratcom.mil/functional_components/ 
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4. Joint Functional Component Command–Integrated Missile 
Defense (JFCC-IMD) 
JFCC-IMD synchronizes operational-level global missile defense planning, 
operations support, and the development of missile defense effects for DoD. 
5. Joint Functional Component Command–Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR) 
JFCC-ISR plans, integrates, and coordinates intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance in support of strategic and global operations and strategic 
deterrence. 
6. USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (SCC–WMD) 
SCC–WMD plans, advocates, and advises the USSTRATCOM 
commander on WMD-related matters. 
7. Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) 
JWAC is a premier science and engineering institution tasked with solving 
complex challenges for U.S. warfighters. JWAC coordinates directly with the 
staffs of all unified commands, combatant commands, Department of Defense 
(DoD) elements, military services, and other government departments and 
agencies in order to protect U.S. and help its armed forces accomplish their 
missions. 
B. SERVICE COMPONENTS133 
1. Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) 
AFGSC is responsible for the Air Force’s three intercontinental ballistic 
missile (ICBM) wings, two B-52 Stratofortress wings and the sole B-2 Spirit wing. 
AFGSC has two numbered air forces that are tasked with providing capabilities to 
                                            
133  Information in this section is taken from Feickert op. cit., 20–21 and USSTRATCOM 
official website. Accessed November 3, 2012. http://www.stratcom.mil/service_components/ 
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combatant commands. The Eighth Air Force controls the long-range nuclear 
bomber assets (B-52s and B-2s) and the Twentieth Air Force controls the ICBM 
wings. 
2. U.S. Army Forces Strategic Command (ARSTRAT) 
ARSTRAT conducts space and missile defense operations and provides 
planning, integration, control, and coordination of Army forces and capabilities in 
support of USSTRATCOM missions. 
3. Fleet Forces Command 
Fleet Forces Command is responsible for the entire Atlantic Ocean, the 
Caribbean Sea, and the waters around Central and South America extending into 
the Pacific to the Galapagos Island.  
4. Marine Corps Forces U.S. Strategic Command 
(MARFORSTRAT)  
MARFORSTRAT serves as the Marine Corps service component to 
USSTRATCOM. 
5. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) 
AFSPC provides space and cybersecurity forces for USSTRATCOM. It 
has two numbered air forces providing these capabilities. The Fourteenth Air 
Force controls and supports several satellite systems including the Global 
Positioning System (GPS); Defense Satellite Communications Systems Phase II 
and III; and the Defense Meteorological Support Program. In addition, the 
Fourteenth Air Force has Atlas, Delta, and Titan launch vehicles at its disposal to 
put payloads into orbit. The Twenty-Fourth Air Force plans and conducts 
cyberspace operations in support of combatant commands. 
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APPENDIX C. U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND’S 
SUBCOMPONENTS 
USSOCOM consists of four component commands and one sub-unified 
command. Their brief description is given hereunder:134 
1. U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) 
USASOC is the largest of the service components that make up 
USSOCOM and provides about 70 percent of the special operations personnel in 
Central Command’s theatre. It includes Army Special Forces, also known as 
Green Berets; Rangers; civil affairs, and military information support operations 
(MISO) units. In addition, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment 
(SOAR) provides rotary-wing support to all SOF units. USASOC forces include: 
 4th MISO Group (Airborne) (4th MISOG)  
 8th MISO Group (Airborne) (8th MISOG)  
 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne)  
 United States Special Forces Command (Airborne).  
 John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.  
 75th Ranger Regiment  
 United States Army Special Operations Aviation Command 
 160th Special Operations Regiment (Airborne)  
 528th Sustainment Brigade (Airborne) 
2. Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC) 
NSWC consists of Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) teams that conduct 
operations in both maritime and ground environments. NSWC also has SEAL 
delivery vehicle (SDV) teams—specialized SEALs that pilot small submersible  
 
                                            
134 Information in this section is taken from USSOCOM website 
http://www.socom.mil/default.aspx and U.S. Army War College IO Primer, November 2011,  146–
147 and Feickert op. cit., 16–18. 
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vehicles that can deliver SEALs to their area of operations. NSWC includes 
special boat teams that can deliver SEALs from ship to shore as well as operate 
in the littorals and rivers. 
3. Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) 
AFSOC provides specialized fixed and rotary wing support to USSOCOM 
units. In addition to aircraft support, AFSOC also provides combat controllers, 
para-rescue jumpers, Special operations weather teams, and tactical air control 
parties (TACPs) to support special operations. AFSOC is currently establishing a 
capacity to train and advise partner nation aviation units as part of foreign 
internal defense initiatives. 
4. Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) 
Established in 2005, MARSOC is the newest USSOCOM subcomponent. 
It consists of three Marine special-operations battalions, a Marine special-
operations support group, a Marine special-operations intelligence battalion, and 
the Marine Special Operations School. 
5. Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) 
 A sub-unified command of USSOCOM, JSOC provides a joint 
headquarters to study special operations requirements, ensures interoperability 
and equipment standardization, develops joint special-operations plans and 
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